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Legal and Policy Constraints on the
Conduct of Aerial Precision Warfare
NathanA. Canestaro*
ABSTRACT

Focusing his historical analysis on World War II, Mr.
Canestaro describes how the substantial legal and policy
controls under which the U.S. military conducts its air
campaigns meet or exceed the requirements of international
treaties and the customary practice of states. Bombing
technology has only recently developed to the point of allowing
compliance with internationallegal standards, and the United
States has implemented stringent measures in recent conflicts to
minimize unintended civilian casualties in warfare. Mr.
Canestaro demonstrates that because these self-imposed
restrictions go beyond the point of mere compliance, they often
constitute a disadvantage to the conduct of U.S. military
operations. Strict U.S. military compliance with international
legal standards and self-imposed policy restrictions derived
from political fear of excessive casualtiesinsure that adversaries
are rarely engaged with the full measure of U.S. military might.
The development of precision weapons over the last several
decades has made armed conflict both more and less lethal.
Against his established historical background, Mr. Canestaro
measures modern U.S. military practice and technology against
the customary standards, concluding that self-imposed legal
and policy restraintsdesigned to protect civilian lives have risen
in step with technological developments allowing greater
precision and thus avoidance of collateral damage. This
situation continues significantly to shape the conduct of
campaigns and to offer advantages to U.S. adversaries who
choose not to follow the customary standardsas faithfully.

* Central Intelligence Agency. Previously served in the Second Gulf War with the
Department of Defense, Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), 20022003. CIA Counterterrorism Center, 2002-2003, CIA Afghanistan and Balkans Task
Forces, 2001. J.D., University of Tennessee, 2001. This material has been reviewed by
CIA. That review neither constitutes CIA authentication of this information nor
implies their endorsement of the author's views.
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I. INTRODUCTION
"Men who take up arms against one another in public war
do not cease on this account to be moral beings, responsible
to one another and to God." 1 Lieber Code, 1863.

1.
Francis Lieber, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United
States in the Field, promulgated as General Orders No. 100 by President Abraham
Lincoln, Apr. 24, 1863, art. 15, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: A
COLLECTION OF CONVENTIONS RESOLUTIONS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS 3 (Dietrich

Schindler & Jiri Toman eds., 3rd rev. ed. 1986) [hereinafter Lieber Code].
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2
"In war the main idea is to get the bombs on the targets."
General Curtis LeMay, U.S. Air Force, 1995.

In the last few years, the media has devoted much time and
effort to documenting the civilian deaths that have resulted from U.S.
military operations around the globe. Every death is a tragedy, but in
Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq, the press has sensationalized these
deaths rather than determining whether they could have been
prevented. Although the media has publicized the impressive
capabilities of precision weaponry, it has not conveyed that military
campaigns are not precise merely because the weapons are. Contrary
to Cicero's adage, silent enim leges inter arma,3 the U.S. military
operates under strict limitations imposed by civilian political
administrations and the requirements of the law of war. It is the
combined effect of these "rules of engagement" and the capabilities of
precision weaponry that have reduced civilian casualties in recent
conflicts.
These restrictions on U.S. military action are driven as much by
political fear of public reaction to casualties as they are by respect for
the law, and are often stricter than the law of war would otherwise
require. Regardless of the motives, the U.S. commitment to the
prevention of noncombatant deaths is extraordinary when viewed in
the context of the difficulty of distinguishing military targets from
nearby civilian areas, the technical challenges to precise aerial
bombing, and the conduct of many U.S. opponents, who often attempt
to exploit U.S. adherence to the law to their advantage.
This Article will establish that the U.S. military conducts its air
campaigns under substantial legal and policy controls that meet or
exceed the requirements of international treaties and the customary
practice of states. Furthermore, this Article will demonstrate that
these self-imposed restrictions go beyond the point of mere
compliance and can be so strict as to constitute a definite
disadvantage against adversaries who attempt to leverage U.S.
compliance for their own military gain. In spite of these apparent
drawbacks, the United States maintains a system of exhaustive legal
review in a target acquisition cycle where speed is often critical and
respects arbitrary policy restrictions that may never allow the enemy
to be fully engaged by the full measure of U.S. military might.

2.
Gen. Curtis LeMay, Eighth Air Force Commanding General to Eighth Air
Force Command Commanding General, Mar. 31, 1944, File 452.26, FolderBombsights, RD-3690, RG 342, quoted in STEPHEN L. MCFARLAND, AMERICA'S PURSUIT
OF PRECISION BOMBING: 1910-1945 7 (1995).

3.

"The law stands mute in the midst of arms." MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, PRO

MILONE, IV, 11, quoted in BARTLETT'S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS: A COLLECTION OF
PASSAGES, PHRASES AND PROVERBS TRACED TO THEIR SOURCES IN MODERN LITERATURE

98 (Emily Morrison Beck ed., 15th ed. 1980).
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In order to establish this claim, this Article will first examine the
development of the legal standards that apply to aerial bombardment
and the related technology and tactics. This will serve to illustrate
that until the end of the Vietnam war, the technology of aerial
bombardment was, to a large degree, not capable of achieving the
precision required by the accepted law. By comparing the customary
practice of nations with the standards codified in international
treaties, this Article will establish that "the history of bombardment
regulation shows a distinct utilitarian development, in which the idea
of military effectiveness dominates, and in which the doctrines of
permissible violence and social sanction are of secondary importance
''4
as checks or influences.
This Article will focus its historical analysis primarily on World
War II as evidence of customary practice, because the crucial national
interests at risk in that conflict forced all parties to cede no
advantage and comply only with the most basic standards for
wartime conduct. 5 Brief examinations will also be made of the use of
air power in regional conflicts that followed the development of
precision weapons, such as the Gulf Wars, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and,
to a lesser degree, Vietnam. These will serve to contrast modern U.S.
practice and technology against the customary standard and to
determine the degree to which legal and policy restraints actually
shaped the conduct of those campaigns.

II.

THE EVOLUTION OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY RELATING TO PRECISION
BOMBING

The basic legal restrictions on the conduct of aerial bombing are
based on the international laws of armed combat, sometimes referred
to as the "law of war". It is "that part of international law that
regulates the conduct of armed hostilities." 6 This body of law is
derived from both codified law, such as treaties and conventions, and
the customary practices of warring states. 7 It "restricts both the

4.

THE LAwS OF WAR: CONSTRAINTS ON WARFARE IN THE WESTERN WORLD 151

(Michael Howard et al. eds., 1994) [hereinafter LAWS OF WAR].
5.
More limited conflicts such as the Gulf Wars and Kosovo will be discussed
later, but their utility as an indication of the practice of nations is hampered by the
relatively peripheral interests at stake. Nations may exercise a more moderate level of
force when no crucial interest, such as national survival, is at stake, but total war is
the most revealing indication of the most basic requirements of war that no nation will
violate.
6.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, CONDUCT OF THE PERSIAN GULF
WAR: FINAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 0- 1, (Apr. 1992) [hereinafter GULF WAR REPORT].
7.
ALAN VICK ET AL., AEROSPACE OPERATIONS IN URBAN ENVIRONMENTS 40

(2000).
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means of waging war and the objects against which such means may
be employed."
The law of war has two specific shortcomings in regard to the
conduct of air operations. First, little of it is specifically dedicated to
aerial warfare. Those few treaties and conventions dedicated to air
combat, or containing provisions that mention it specifically, are
either unratified or have not been recognized as binding by the
United States. Thus, legal practitioners have been forced to adapt to
the subject of-air operations the body of law that covers land or naval
warfare or the use of force generally,9 much of which was drafted
before the development of powered flight.
A second shortcoming in the conduct of air operations is that the
law of war is not enforceable upon nations in the traditional sense; no
permanent international judicial body with the necessary universal
jurisdiction exists to enforce it, and domestic courts only rarely
adjudicate violations. 10 Instead, compliance with the law often stems
from decisions of national policy or military necessity-suggesting
that in the most serious conflicts, limitations on warfare are more
likely to be abandoned entirely." In this manner, the laws of war are
"respected and enforced [between opposing states] in an ongoing
process of reciprocation and retaliation. Arrangements that seemed to
be in the common interest of the antagonists [are] respected so long
12
as compliance [is] reciprocal.'

8.
LESLIE C. GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 118
(Gilliam M. White ed., 1993).
9.
Id. at 118, 173.
10.
See Michael C. Bonafede, Here, There, and Everywhere: Assessing the
Proportionality Doctrine and U.S. Uses of Force in Response to Terrorism after the
September 11 Attacks, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 155, 203 (2002) ('While domestic politics
functions under a system of authority, global politics is anarchic. There is no central
authority to determine how nations should act ...and unilaterally enforce rules for such
interactions.'); see also JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S SCHOOL OPERATIONAL LAW
HANDBOOK 28 (LCDR William O'Brien, JAGC USN et al. eds. 2003) [hereinafter
OPERATIONAL LAW] (indicating that under U.S. law, commission of war crimes, which are
also violations of the law of war, are enforceable against individuals as criminal offenses).
It is Department of Defense policy that any member of the armed forces that commits a
war crime will be charged under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Furthermore, The
War Crimes Act of 1997, 18 U.S.C. § 2401 (1997), provides federal courts with jurisdiction
to prosecute any person inside or outside of the United States for war crimes if a U.S.
national stands accused or was a victim. Id.
11.
MICHAEL C. WAXMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE POLITICS OF URBAN
AIR OPERATIONS 25-26 (2000) ("Public and coalition sensitivity to friendly casualties...
often reduces operational flexibility more severely than does adherence to the
international law of armed conflict."); see also THE LAWS OF WAR: A COMPREHENSIVE
COLLECTION OF PRIMARY DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL LAWS GOVERNING ARMED
CONFLICT xviii (W. Michael Reisman & Chris T. Antoniou eds., 1st ed. 1994)
[hereinafter Reisman & Antoniou].
12.
Reisman & Antoniou, supra note 11, at xvii-xviii.
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A. Pre-World War I
Although much of the law of war has been derived from the
practice of nations and the Christian "just war" tradition, it was not
until the industrialized wars of the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries that the law of war began to be formally codified.
The "written and organizational genesis"13 of this modern body of law
was the 1863 Lieber Code. Drafted by Columbia University Professor
Francis Lieber and implemented as the U.S. Army's General Orders
No. 100, this code was the first attempt to draft formal regulations
based on customary practice. 14 It reflected the traditional
permissibility of attacks on all enemy combatants, stating that
"military necessity admits of all direct destruction of life or limb of
armed enemies, and of other persons whose destruction is
incidentally unavoidable in the armed contests of the war." 15 Under
the justification of military necessity, the Lieber Code also allowed
attacks against other targets that "are indispensable for securing the
ends of the war, and which are lawful according to the modern law
and usages of war. '16 It also recognized the traditional immunity of
noncombatants, but conceded that they could not be completely
separated from the burdens of the conflict:
The citizen or native of a hostile country is thus an enemy, as one of the
constituents of the hostile state or nation, and as such is subjected to
the hardships of war .... Nevertheless, as civilization has advanced...
so has ... the distinction between the private individual belonging to a
hostile country and the hostile country itself, with its men in arms. The
principle has been more and more acknowledged that the unarmed
citizen is to be spared in person, property, and honor as much as the
exigencies of war will admit. 17

This provision in the Code reflected the customary understanding
that when noncombatants are injured or killed as a result of an
attack against a lawful target, the attack remains legal provided the
civilian deaths are indirect and unintentional in relation to the initial
act.18 These unintended noncombatant deaths, known in modern

13.
Lt. Commander Stuart Walters Belt (USN), Missiles Over Kosovo:
Emergence, Lex Lata, of a Customary Norm Requiringthe Use of PrecisionMunitions in
Urban Areas, 47 NAVAL L. REV. 115, 137 (2000).
14.
GREEN, supra note 8, at 27; see also W. Hays Parks, Air Law and the Law
of War, 32 A.F. L. REV. 1, 7 (1990). The Lieber Code later served as a model both for
other nations' codes of conduct and for the international conventions on the law of
armed combat. See GREEN, supra note 8, at 27-28.
15.
Lieber Code, supra note 1, art. 15.
16.
Id. art. 14.
17.
Id. arts. 21-22.
18.
Parks, supra note 14, at 4.
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as the cost of
military parlance as "collateral damage," were regarded
9
waging war and not the responsibility of the attacker.'
This "siege doctrine" originated from the practice of laying siege
to an enemy city. Once the city had been surrounded, and the offer to
accept a surrender had been extended by the attackers and declined
by the defenders, injury or death of noncombatants garrisoned inside
was traditionally the responsibility of the besieged commander
because it resulted from his refusal to surrender. 20 Furthermore, once
the city had fallen, the attacker could put all occupants-including
noncombatant women and children-to the sword. Although this
latter practice had declined by the Industrial Age, allotting
responsibility to the defender for noncombatant deaths encouraged a
the consequences of continued
prompt capitulation by making
21
resistance too grievous to accept.
It was not until the ratification of the Hague Conventions of
1899 and 1907 that the international community was successful in
codifying international regulations that directly affected combat
operations. 22 At the time, aviation was in its infancy-with the
Wright brothers' first successful flight occurring in 1903-and there
was little international recognition that aviation would soon make a
significant contribution to warfare.2 3 The only direct mention of aerial
bombardment in either the 1899 or 1907 Conventions was a five-year
moratorium placed on the dropping of projectiles and explosives from
24
balloons contained in Commission I of the 1899 Hague Conference.
No other portion of these instruments dealt with air combat
specifically, but they did contain other rules that were applicable to
the subject by inference. 2 5 For example, the 1907 Hague IV
Convention regarding the "Laws and Customs of War on Land" linked
the propriety of an attack to that which is "demanded by the
necessities of war," 26 confirming that a legitimate military target
could be attacked wherever located.2 7 However, it also prohibited the
"attack or bombardment of towns, villages, habitations, or buildings,
which are undefeated. '28 Although presumably drafted with the
intent of regulating bombardment by land-based artillery, this rule
implied that an attack against a city where resistance continued was

Id. at 4, 18-19, 31.
19.
Id. at 4.
20.
Id.
21.
Id. at 19.
22.
GREEN, supra note 8, at 35.
23.
LAWS OF WAR, supra note 4, at 141.
24.
Id. at 118, 173.
25.
Convention Relative to the Opening of Hostilities, Oct. 18, 1907, art. 23(g),
26.
36 Stat. 2259 [hereinafter Hague IV].
Parks, supra note 14, at 14.
27.
28.
Hague IV, supra note 26, art. 25.
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acceptable, a principle that could be applied to the conduct of aerial
bombardment.
This "defended places" rule also reflected the customary siege
rule under which the defender bore responsibility for casualties
resulting from his failure to surrender. Hague IV also made
provisions for protection of noncombatants and required the
preservation of humanitarian facilities such as hospitals, churches,
and museums. "In sieges and bombardments, all necessary steps
should be taken to spare as far as possible buildings dedicated to
religion, art, science, or charitable purposes, historical monuments,
hospitals, and places where the sick and wounded are collected,
'29
provided they are not used at the same time for military purposes.
However, it also established that "it is the duty of the besieged to
indicate the presence of such buildings," 30 confirming the
responsibility of the defender to mitigate noncombatant loss.
The 1907 Hague IX Convention contained several provisions on
naval bombardment that were generally applicable to aerial bombing.
It relieved an attacker of legal responsibility for collateral damage
that was "unavoidable,"3 1 bringing naval bombardment within the
scope of the siege rule.3 2 Although only intended as a codification of
customary law, 33 Hague IX stepped beyond Hague IV in that it
provided specific guidance in the types of targets that could be
legitimately attacked. These sites included "military works, military
or naval establishments, depots of arms or war material, workshops
or plants which could be utilized for the needs of the hostile fleet or
army, and the ships of war in the harbor. '3 4 This broad construction
of military necessity was significant in that it indicated civilian
industry that supported the war effort could be lawfully attacked.3 5
B. World War I and the Interwar Period
Meetings to establish subsequent international conventions
regarding the conduct of warfare were pre-empted by the onset of
World War I. The significant strike role aircraft could play in this
conflict was not initially recognized, and so at first, aircraft were
mainly used for scouting and reconnaissance. Small-scale aerial
bombing raids conducted by the Germans in 1914 started a cycle of

29.
Id. art. 27.
30.
Id.
31.
Convention Concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War,
Oct. 18, 1907, art. 2, 36 Stat. 2351 [hereinafter Hague IX].
32.
Parks, supra note 14, at 19.
33.
Id. at 20.
34.
Hague IX, supra note 31, art. 2.
35.
Parks, supra note 14, at 18.
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escalatory attacks, however, and by the end of the war both sides
were using aircraft to bomb enemy urban and industrial centers. 36
Although each side accused the other of deliberately targeting the
civilian population, 37 the historical record suggests that harm done to
civilians during the war was caused by inadequacies in navigation,
target identification, and bombing accuracy rather than "malice
aforethought."38
Aviators in World War I had only three basic methods by which
to navigate to their targets. The first was to employ celestial
positioning, which was time consuming. The second was to use dead
reckoning, which was often inaccurate. 39 Finally, pilots could "fly the
iron compass" and orient themselves by following roads and rail lines
from the air, 40 but this often exposed them to deadly ground fire.
Because the technology of aiming bombs remained crude, and pilots
found it difficult to distinguish targets from the air, bombardments
were often so inaccurate that those on the ground often could not
determine whether the attack was aimed at a military target or
directed against the civilian population. 4 1 Furthermore, as both sides'
anti-aircraft defenses improved, bombers were forced to fly at higher
altitudes and at night to improve their chances for survival, further
diminishing their overall accuracy.
Following the war, jurists and politicians
attempted
unsuccessfully to control the sudden emergence of aviation as a part
of warfare in three ways: (1) restricting the types and quantity of
aircraft available to combatants, (2) prohibiting certain tactics, and
(3) attempting to establish international legal constraints on the use
of aircraft generally. 42 Because the 1922 Washington Conference on
the Limitation of Armaments failed to establish any regulation of
these methods to control aerial warfare, the Hague Commission of
Jurists subsequently convened to undertake the latter two methods. 4 3
The Hague Draft Rules of Air Warfare produced by this
Commission departed from customary law in several crucial ways.

36.

HERMANN KNELL, To DESTROY A CITY: STRATEGIC

BOMBING AND ITS

HUMAN CONSEQUENCES IN WORLD WAR II 105-117 (2003) ('The Germans had started
bombing civilians... but were hit back."); MICHAEL S. SHERRY, THE RISE OF AMERICAN
AIR POWER: THE CREATION OF ARMAGEDDON 12-13 (1987).

37.
38.

KNELL, supra note 36, at 108-09.
Parks, supra note 14, at 22.

39.

MICHAEL RUSSELL RIP & JAMES M. HASIK, THE PRECISION REVOLUTION:

GPS AND THE FUTURE OF AERIAL WARFARE 16-17 (2002).
40.
Id. at 17.
41.
LAWS OF WAR, supra note 4, at 145.
42.
Donald Cameron Watt, Restraints on War in the Air Before 1945, in
RESTRAINTS ON WAR: STUDIES IN THE LIMITATION OF ARMED CONFLICT 63 (Michael Howard

ed., 1979).
43.
Id. at 66; SHERRY, supra note 36, at 33-34; see also GREEN, supra note 8, at
36 (noting that, while the rules drawn up by the jurists have some authority, they are
not binding).
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For example, in addition to specifically applying the Hague IX
provisions outlawing the bombardment of enemy cities to air
combat, 44 the Draft Rules provided that "aerial bombardment is
legitimate only when directed at a military objective, that is to say,
an object of which the destruction or injury would constitute a
distinct military advantage to the belligerent. '45 This was a
departure from customary law in that it attempted to shift the
46
responsibility for avoiding collateral damage to the attacker.
In another departure from customary law, Sectionr 24(2) of the
Draft Rules strictly limited the set of permissible targets to military
forces, thus excluding the types of attacks against civilian industrial
targets that had been permissible under Hague IV and Hague IX and
were common practice during World War 1. 47 Finally, in Article 24(3),
the Draft Rules stated:
[T]he bombardment of cities, towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings not
in the immediate neighborhood of the operations of land forces is
prohibited ...in cases where [military objectives are in cities, and] they
cannot be bombarded without the indiscriminate bombardment of the
civilian
population,
the aircraft
must abstain
from such
48
bombardment.

This rule differed from customary law by limiting bombardment to
the front lines and by suggesting that an evaluation of the legality of
an attack be based upon the results of the attack rather than an
analysis of the intent of the attacker. 49 Scholars noted that as a result
of these differences from the then-current law, the first and only
effort at regulation of aerial bombardment before World War II was
"doomed from the outset by language that established rules for blackand-white situations in a combat environment permeated by shades
'50
of gray.
While politicians and lawyers were struggling unsuccessfully to
control aviation as a tool of warfare, military strategists were

44.
KNELL, supra note 36, at 131.
45.
The Hague Draft Rules of Air Warfare, Feb. 19, 1923, art. 24(1), reprinted
in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 121 (Adam Roberts & Richard Gueff eds., 2d ed.
1989) [hereinafter Hague Draft Rules].
46.
Parks, supra note 14, at 32. ("[Article 24(1) was a 180-degree change of
course in then-existing bombardment philosophy.").
47.
Id. at 34.
48.
Hague Draft Rules, supra note 45, art. 24(3).
49.
Parks, supra note 14, at 34.
50.
Id. at 35. Legal scholars from states that have ratified Protocol I-which
echoes many of the limitations in the 1923 Hague Draft Rules-are more likely to cite
the Draft Rules' relevance and effect on modern law. See GREEN, supra note 8, at 36, in
which the Canadian author notes that the Draft Rules are "an authoritative attempt to
clarify and formulate rules of law governing the use of aircraft in war."
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defining the aerial doctrine that would be used in the next war. 51
During the late 1920s and early 1930s, planners at the newly formed
Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS) theorized that precision bombing
against key industrial nodes and economic targets could effectively
bring an opponent state to its knees. 52 If sufficient numbers of these
"bottleneck" targets could be destroyed from the air, ACTS planners
theorized, it might be possible to "paralyze the [enemy] nation's
'53
ability to wage war ... and [its] hostile will to resist.
Although bombers in the First World War were not capable of
this level of precision, the staff at ACTS believed that formations of
more modern bombers equipped with sophisticated high altitude
bomb-aiming equipment could "prove to be a more convincing
argument against war than all the Hague and Geneva Conventions
put together. '54 Subsequent demonstrations of the capabilities of
aerial bombing-such as the 1921 sinking of the surrendered German
battleship Ostfriesland off the coast of Virginia-raised international
interest by proving aircraft could inflict serious damage, but did little
to overcome political opposition to funding a significant increase in
the Air Corps. 55 Partly because of "deep-rooted opposition to making
civilians targets in war," and partly because of perceptions that
strategic bombing was inconsistent with the official U.S. policy of
isolationism, U.S. air power did not receive the resources required to
56
build more than just a token force until late in the 1930s.
An accepted-or at least not refuted--counterargument to the
precision doctrine of ACTS suggested that accuracy was not needed in

51.
McFARLAND, supra note 2, at 27 (discussing doctrines created by, among
others, the field officers school and the Morrow Board).
52.

BENJAMIN S. LAMBETH, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN AIR POWER 264

(2000); SHERRY, supra note 36, at 51-57 ("[The Acts Doctrine] saw economic targets as a
more effective point of attack on the enemy's nerves."); see also LAWS OF WAR, supra note
4, at 150.
53.
McFARLAND, supra note 2, at 91.
54.
LAWS OF WAR, supra note 4, at 150; SHERRY, supra note 36, at 57.
55.
Although the sinking of the Ostfriedland was heralded by air power
advocates as proof positive of the power of precision bombing, a close examination of
the results of the attack revealed the accuracy problems that continued to plague aerial
bombing. General Mitchell's eight biplanes dropped their bombs on a motionless,
defenseless vessel 546 feet long and 93 feet wide from altitudes no higher than 2,500
feet, but were only able score hits 19 percent of the time. Although viewed by
contemporaries as a great success it seems apparent now that the technology of aerial
bombing had still not caught up with the strategy of the time. MCFARLAND, supra note
2, at 46-47; see also GERALD ASTOR, THE MIGHTY EIGHTH: THE AIR WAR IN EUROPE AS
TOLD BY THE MEN WHO FOUGHT IT 6 (1997); SHERRY, supra note 36, at 36-37, 49

(chronicling lack of political support for aerial support). Mitchell was later courtmartialled and used the trial as a stage from which to condemn the neglect of air power
by the U.S. military. See RONALD SCHAFFER, WINGS OF JUDGMENT: AMERICAN
BOMBING IN WORLD WAR II 11 (1985).

56.

MCFARLAND, supra note 2, at 82; see also SHERRY, supra note 36, at 36-37,
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aerial bombing to produce military results. 57 A variety of theorists
believed that extensive bombing of population centers would affect
the morale of civilian populations, reducing their will to fight and
58
increasing public pressure on their governments to end wars.
Paralleling the siege rule, this theory also supported the idea that an
unrestricted and brutal war would either deter the initiation of
conflicts or hasten their conclusion, reducing the considerable cost in
human life that would result from a long and protracted conflict. 59
Although modern military lawyers such as W. Hays Parks have
dismissed this theory as an "afterthought to explain away the
inherent inaccuracy of bombing, 60° the concept of unrestrained
bombing against the enemy had many prominent supporters at the
time.
Sources as early as the 1863 Lieber Code suggested of nations at
war that "peace is their normal condition; war is the exception. The
ultimate object of all modern war is a renewed state of peace. The
'61
more vigorously wars are pursued, the better it is for humanity.
Italian Brigadier Commander Giulio Douhet's 1921 work IlDominio
dell'Aria (Command of the Air) was one of the cornerstone works for
this argument. Douhet believed that modern war was more than just
armies in the field; it involved an entire society, including "the soldier
carrying his rifle, the woman loading shells in a factory, the farmer
growing wheat, the scientist experimenting in his factory. '62 Aerial
attacks on front-line military troops only intensified the carnage on
the battlefield, but civilians lacked the determination of soldiers and
'6 3
were thus vulnerable to attacks against their "will to resist.
Because the "decisive blows will be directed at civilians, that
element ... least able to sustain them,"64 . . .the infliction of high

57.
Parks, supra note 14, at 51 (generally explaining support for
"indiscriminate bombardment").
58.
SCHAFFER, supra note 55, at 20-21; see also Parks, supra note 14, at 51-52.
59.
SHERRY, supra note 36, at 16 ("The principal element in the moral case for
strategic bombing is that it would rescue humanity from the horrors of stalemated,
industrialized war."). The siege rule was later specifically invoked by Sir Arthur
Harris, the British Air Marshall in charge of RAF Bomber Command, in order to justify
the RAF's nighttime area bombing of urban areas. See KNELL, supra note 36, at 218.
60.
Parks, supra note 14, at 55. Critics of the time, such as U.S. Secretary of
War Newton D. Baker, also condemned strategic bombing of urban areas as "an
abandonment of the time-honored practice among civilized people of restricting
bombardment to fortified places or to places from which the civilian population had an
opportunity to be removed." MCFARLAND, supra note 2, at 81.
61.
Lieber Code, supra note 1, art. 29. Other modern scholars, such as British
author J.M. Spaight echoed this argument, arguing that the power of aviation to end
wars quickly through maximum violence made it a "savior of civilization." KNELL,
supra note 36, at 54.
62.
SCHAFFER, supra note 55, at 21.
63.
MCFARLAND, supra note 2, at 77-78.
64.
SCHAFFER, supra note 55, at 22.
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civilian casualties would unravel civilian morale, and create pressure
65
upon the opponent state to capitulate.
Douhet was not arguing that the moral barrier between killing
troops and killing civilians should be breached. Instead, he believed
that technology had made civilians part of the national war machine,
thus making a distinction between the two groups obsolete. 66 Douhet
was only one of numerous prominent military personnel who
supported aerial attacks against civilian populations. In the United
States, General Billy Mitchell also shared the conviction that a war
must be taken to the citizens of the enemy state. Civilians, he
reasoned, are "manufacturers of munitions," 67 and therefore subject
to bombing. Although he expected international conferences to outlaw
the bombing of cities, he echoed Douhet in arguing that strategic
bombing was "a benefit to civilization" in that it would take fewer
lives and expend fewer resources than traditional clashes between
68
armies.
C. World War I's "Crisisof Distinction"
Even without the ratification of any international instrument
specifically relating to aerial bombardment, the nations that would
soon be fighting World War II drafted their own unilateral policies
that reflected their understanding of customary law. In 1938, British
Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain declared Britain would comply
with the 1923 Hague Draft Rules 69 and stated it was "against
international law" deliberately to attack civilians.7 0 He also required
that bombing targets be "legitimate military objectives ... capable of
identification," 71 and that British bomber crews exercise "reasonable
care" in attacking military objectives, "so that by carelessness a
civilian population in the neighborhood is not bombed. '72 These
guidelines were issued to the Royal Air Force in September of that
year, along with a stern warning that targets should not be bombed
"unless [they can be] attacked with a reasonable expectation of

65.
LAMBETH, supra note 52, at 270.
66.
SCHAFFER, supra note 55, at 23, 33 (providing example of Allied Forces
attack on Germany).
67.
MCFARLAND, supra note 2, at 76.
68.
Id. at 77; SCHAFFER, supra note 55, at 25-26; SHERRY, supra note 36, at 2930. Similar arguments were made in Britain by former Chief of the Air Staff Hugh
Trenchard, who viewed air war as primarily a contest of "moral tenacity" between two
adversaries--"if we could bomb the enemy more intensely and more continually than
he could bomb us the result might be an early offer of peace." PHILLIP S. MEILINGER,
AIRWAR: THEORY AND PRACTICE 46 (Studies in Air Power, Sebastian Cox ed., 2003).
69.

KNELL, supra note 36, at 324.

70.
71.
72.

Parks, supra note 14, at 36.
Id.

Id.
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damage being confined to them. 7 3 Although these requirements
reflected the customary requirement that the attacker exercise
reasonable care, the Chief of the British Air Staff believed that the
guidelines would be abandoned once the war started. "I feel sure," he
commented, "that this instruction will not last very long, but we
74
obviously cannot be the first to 'take the gloves off."'
Much as they had in World War I, navigational and target
identification inadequacies continued to hamper the accuracy of
bombing in World War II. 75 For the first time, aircraft used radionavigation systems to find their targets, but these systems often had
limited range and were vulnerable to jamming or spoofing by the
opposing side. 76 Additionally, much as it had in the first war,
accurate anti-aircraft fire forced bombers to fly at night and at high
altitude to increase their chances for survival. 77 A 1942 study of
British nighttime bombing accuracy, known as the Butt Report, found
that only two bomber crews in five came within five miles of their
targets, 78 and this rate dropped to one in ten among aircraft flying
79
against the most heavily defended zones, such as the Ruhr.
By February 1942, the British had come to doubt the
effectiveness of "precise" bombing of industrial and military targets.
Instead, Bomber Command's Directive 22 made "the morale of the
enemy civil population" and industrial workers living in the vicinity
of their factories the primary target of British bombs.8 0 The rationale
behind this switch was that reduction in industrial production would
be affected "at least as much by the indirect effect of damage to
services, housing, and amenities, as by any direct damage to the
factories."' l This "city busting" or "de-housing" campaign was based
on the principle that, in the words of Hugh Trenchard, the Chief of

73.
Id. at 45. The German Luftwaffe had similar restrictions; a 1936 training
manual noted that "attacks on cities for the purpose of terrorizing the civilian
population are absolutely forbidden." SCHAFFER, supra note 55, at 35. U.S. President
Franklin D. Roosevelt also appealed to both sides on the first day of the war to abstain
from deliberate bombing of the civilian population. RALPH BARKER, THE RAF AT WAR
27 (1981).
74.
Parks, supra note 14, at 45.
75.
Even as late as August 1939, performance evaluations of RAF Bomber
Command crews found that "Over 40% of [British] bombers were unable to find a
target in a friendly city in broad daylight." LAWS OF WAR, supra note 4, at 149.
76.
Rip & HASIK, supra note 39, at 27. For details on the workings of early
radio-navigation methods, especially the German Knickebein, X-Verhafen, and YVerhafen systems, and the comparable British Gee and Oboe systems, see id. at 19-31.
See also BARKER, supranote 73, at 140-41.
77.
KNELL, supra note 36, at 276-77; McFARLAND, supra note 2, at 166-67.
78.
Id. at 166.
79.
ASTOR, supranote 55, at 19.
80.
KNELL, supranote 36, at 209; McFARLAND, supra note 2, at 166.
81.
McFARLAND, supra note 2, at 166.
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RAF Bomber Command, "in order to destroy anything it is necessary
to destroy everything. '82 Destruction of the actual facilities was
83
unintended but "regarded as a bonus."
The British Air Ministry maintained that these types of attacks
did not fall within the bounds of the Hague Conventions because no
Hague treaty had been ratified that specifically covered air combat.
The Ministry argued that the existence of international law
specifically dedicated to land- and sea-based conflict proved that the
Hague treaties were to be narrowly construed, leaving air warfare
effectively unregulated. Under a similar argument made by a staff
lawyer for the German Luftwaffe, Hague IV-which stated it
protected citizens during the "physical conquest" of their land-was
only applicable to ground combat and did not restrict aerial
84
bombing.
The United States entered the air war in Europe in 1943, and
initially the U.S. Army Air Corps remained committed to the doctrine
of precision bombing developed at ACTS.8 5 However, once the U.S.
bombing campaign began in earnest, U.S. aircrews encountered many
of the same challenges that had prompted the British to adopt area
bombing. As in World War I, Allied bombers were forced to fly at
increasing altitudes in order to avoid German antiaircraft fire. This
added to the difficulties of positively identifying targets, as the
Germans engaged in an extensive campaign of distribution and
concealment of their military and industrial complexes. 8 6 Even when
the target could be positively identified, bomb accuracy dropped
sharply as altitude increased, to a low of just five percent of bombs
falling within 1,000 feet of the target where the aircraft was flying in
excess of 27,500 feet.8 7 Cloud cover had an equally detrimental effect
on daylight bombing accuracy; the measured circular error probable
(CEP)8 8 doubled when cloud cover obscured the target. In clear skies,
U.S. bombers had an expected CEP slightly over 1,000 feet, which

82.
Id. at 166.
83.
KNELL, supra note 36, at 77, 218; MCFARLAND, supra note 2, at 166.
84.
KNELL, supra note 36, at 326-27. Furthermore, the German lawyer, later a
law professor at the University of Gottingen, argued that even if the bombings were
purported to violate international law, the acceptance of the tactic by both sides made
it common international law. Id.
85.
SHERRY, supra note 36, at 99.
86.
By 1942, Parks notes that German industrial centers such as the Ruhr
were "so heavily defended against air attack and military objectives so carefully
concealed and camouflaged that it was practically impossible for attacking aircraft to
identify and attack particular targets." Parks, supra note 14, at 161 (quoting Morris
Greenspan, THE MODERN LAW OF LAND WARFARE 335-36 (1959)).

87.
MCFARLAND, supra note 2, at 174.
88.
The CEP is a measure of the average bomb miss; or the distance in which a
bomb could be expected to travel off its intended impact point. It is the "radius of a
circle that contains 50 percent of all the randomly varying statistical bomb impacts
occupying a two dimensional area." RIP & HASIK, supra note 39, at 214.
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increased to 1,200 feet at fifty percent cloud cover, and almost 2,000
feet through completely overcast skies. 89
Ironically, the development of airborne radar navigation systems
capable of all-weather operation did nothing to improve precision
bombing. Radar could detect large landmarks-such as cities-in
even the worst weather, but it did not have sufficient resolution to
pick out specific targets within those cities. However, because the Air
Corps needed to maintain the pressure of the bombing campaign
despite the persistently overcast European skies, Air Force Chief of
Staff General 'Hap' Arnold authorized the Air Corps to bomb German
cities using radar when weather or smoke made precise identification
of targets impossible. 90 By late 1944, as many as three-fourths of
total missions bombed entirely by radar, suggesting that, as far as
the Air Corps was concerned, it was better "to bomb badly rather
than not at all."9 1
Although the U.S. prohibition against "indiscriminate" bombing
remained, as one author notes, "sometimes it was adhered to, often it
was not, or it was so broadly reinterpreted as to become
meaningless. ' 92 As analysis of bombing results became available,
senior planners from the 8th Air Force quickly became disillusioned
with the effectiveness of their "precision" bombing. The chief of the 8th
Air Force's planning section noted:
It became apparent that to destroy, or even to hit, a given target was
going to call for a vastly greater weight of [bombs dropped] than had
been dreamed of in a pre-war doctrine. Contrary to all expectations,
with a few notable exceptions, the strategic bombers . . . seldom
93
succeeded in achieving real precision.

Even Curtis LeMay, who helped develop many of the bombing
techniques employed by the 8th Air Force, groused that the results
94
were "stinko."
To correct for their inaccuracy, the Allies were forced to resort to
one of two practical approaches--either dropping bigger bombs or
sending more aircraft with more bombs. Although the British Royal
Air Force employed the former method to a limited degree, 95 it was

89.
MCFARLAND, supra note 2, at 39.
90.
Id. at 178; see also LAWS OF WAR, supranote 4, at 153.
91.
SHERRY, supra note 36, at 162.
92.
Id. at 261. After 1943, U.S. planners were less concerned with protecting
the lives of German civilians than they were in inflicting damage which might shorten
the war. As stated by Hap Arnold, the United States was not "going to pull its punches
because some civilian got killed." KNELL, supranote 36, at 81.
93.
McFARLAND, supra note 2, at 169-70.
94.
Id. at 170.
95.
12,000 pound 'Tallboy' and 22,000 pound 'Grand Slam' bombs were used
with mixed success by the Royal Air Force against hardened targets such as U-boat
pens, bridges, and coastal artillery. RIP & HASIK, supra note 39, at 37.
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the latter approach that was most often employed after 1944. Because
there was no way to guarantee that a single bomb dropped would
strike its intended target, huge formations of bombers were employed
to carpet bomb an area to increase the chance of a hit. By amassing
as many as a thousand aircraft in dense formations, a target area
could be struck with tens of thousands of bombs. 96 Although many
bombs would be wildly inaccurate, statistically some would have to
97
hit the targets.
The Chief of the British Air Staff proved to be right that the
loose legal controls on aerial bombing would not outlast the war. At
best, the pre-war international legal standards for aerial warfare
were "murky" and not strong enough to constrain states. 98 Given the
stakes of the war for the Allies-essentially, national survival-it is
not clear that, even if the laws were stronger, states would have
complied, especially if that compliance would have limited their
military operations.99 Postwar legal scholars rationalized the erosion
of legal compliance by citing the difficulty of drafting laws that would
be followed by determined combatants. "It is far easier to moralize
about air attacks on civilians, and to offer soothing verbal solutions,
and to dismiss target area bombing as probably unlawful, than [it is]
to frame rules for the mitigation of human suffering with some hope
of belligerent observation amid the realities of modern war."1 00 In any
event, the war demonstrated that vast numbers of aircraft, rapidly
advancing technological capabilities, and the intermixing of warrelated industrial targets with urban centers generated a "crisis of
discrimination," in which the means for area bombing was present,
but the technology to discriminate military targets from civilian areas
was not.10 1

96.

McFARLAND, supra note 2, at 172.
97.
Following the war, a comprehensive study of the effects of strategic
bombing, known as the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, provided considerable data on
U.S. bombing effectiveness. For example, in its wartime missions against three
German synthetic oil factories, the U.S. Air Corps dropped 123,586 tons of bombs to get
19,029 tons within the fenceline of the target facility. Of those bombs, only 4,326 tons
actually damaged the facility. Id. at 16.
LAWS OF WAR, supra note 4, at 157.
98.
Id.
99.
100.
Parks, supra note 14, at 14 (quoting Julius Stone, LEGAL CONTROLS OF
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT, 627 (1954)); see also Michael Howard, Temperamenta Belli:
Can War Be Controlled?, in RESTRAINTS ON WAR: STUDIES IN THE LIMITATION OF ARMED

CONFLICT 4 (Michael Howard ed., 1979) ('The military principle of 'economy of force' may
sometimes conveniently coincide with the dictates of transcendent moral values, but
there is little historical justification for assuming that this will always be the case.').
LAWS OF WAR, supra note 4, at 140.
101.
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D. Vietnam and ProtocolI
The U.S. way of war has always relied on material and
technological superiority over manpower,10 2 but the introduction of
several new technologies late in the Vietnam war finally allowed air
power to overcome the inherent problems of inaccuracy that drove the
"crisis of discrimination" in World War II. During the early stages of
the war, it became apparent that air forces' ability to strike targets
3
accurately "had increased only incrementally" since World War 11.1
For example, the destruction of the Paul Doumer Bridge in Hanoi
required 113 sorties by USAF F-105 fighter-bombers during 1966 and
1967 and the use of 380 tons of bombs.1 0 4 This inability to destroy
strategically important bridges such as the Doumer without a
substantial expenditure of resources prompted the Air Force to look
for methods of improving bomb accuracy.
The development during the mid-1960s of hand-held laser
designators, and a guidance system capable of following the beam,
offered the first practical solution. The first laser-guided bomb (LGB),
known as the Paveway, 0 56 was initially used in 1968 to strike highvalue targets before the bombing of North Vietnam was prohibited by
President Johnson. 10 6 When the moratorium was lifted in May 1972,
16 F-4 fighter-bombers with LGBs destroyed the rebuilt Doumer
bridge on a single mission using only seven percent of the number of
bombs required by the earlier attack.' 0 7 LGBs were later used with
great success in the Linebacker I and II raids in 1972 to cut off the
supply lines of the Viet Cong. 10 8
Following the end of the Vietnam war, diplomatic conferences
hosted by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
convened to consider the first substantial changes to the law of armed
conflict since the 1940s.10 9 Over the course of four sessions from 1974
to 1977, a commission of international delegates drafted Protocol I to

102.
VICK, supra note 7, at 54.
103.
RIP & HASIK, supra note 39, at 204.
104.
Id.
105.
Vernon Loeb, Bursts of Brilliance: How a String of Discoveries by
Unheralded Engineers and Airmen Helped Bring America to the Pinnacle of Modern
Military Power, WASH. POST MAG., Dec. 15, 2002, at 6.
106.
Id.
107.
RIP & HASIK, supra note 39, at 205; see also LAMBETH, supra note 52, at 26;
LON 0. NORDEEN, AIR WARFARE IN THE MISSILE AGE 45, 55 (2002).

108.
Belt, supra note 13, at 117. Although LGB's reportedly had great effectwith a reported accuracy rate as high as 80 percent-the 21,000 Paveways dropped
amounted to less than one percent of the 3.3 million total bombs employed in the
conflict. RIP & HASIK, supra note 39, at 205; see also Loeb, supra note 105, at 3.
109.
Parks, supra note 14, at 75-76.
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the Geneva Convention of 1949. Although this Protocol was ratified
by many of the major Western powers, after a thorough review of its
provisions, the United States opted not to follow suit. Instead, the
United States has declared its intention "to be bound by [the
110
provisions only] to the extent that they reflect customary law."
There were a number of factors that motivated this rejection.
First, much as in the case of the 1923 Hague Draft Rules, the United
States objected to Protocol I's departure from established principles of
customary law. Primarily, these alterations involved an attempted
shifting of the responsibility for preventing civilian casualties from
the defender to the attacker. 111 In addition, the treaty reflected the
ICRC's desire to limit warfare to the immediate battlefield and
prohibit the use of air power to strike any targets beyond the front
lines, regardless of their contribution to the war effort. This reflected
the intention of the 1923 Air Protocols and was inconsistent with the
U.S. position that civilians, regardless of their location, were
legitimate targets when they contributed to the war effort. 1' 2 As such,
Protocol I was seen by some observers as a way of making an effective
prosecution of the war by an attacker legally impossible by
preventing attacks entirely. "Cloaked in a humanitarian guise,"
Parks noted, "the articles of Protocol I were drafted with a view to offsetting any military advantage a superior enemy force might haveparticularly an air power-in attacking another [third world] nation."
ICRC officials did nothing to change this perception; one was
reportedly heard to say "If we cannot outlaw war, we will make it too
complex for the commander to fight!"113 It is unrealistic to expect,
however, that a law of war that is biased against either side would be
respected by both sides. As Parks noted, "Any law of war rule that
offers the potential for a military advantage ... isa rule doomed to
'114
failure.

110.

VICK, supra note 7, at 41 n.3.

111.
Danielle L. Infeld, Precision Guided Munitions Demonstrated Their
Pinpoint Accuracy in Desert Storm; But Is a Country Obligated to Use Precision
Technology to Minimize Collateral Civilian Injury and Damage?, 26 GEO. WASH. J.
INT'L L. & ECON. 109, 122-23 (1992).

Echoing Douhet's theories, it was the U.S. position that aerial
112.
bombardment should not be limited purely to the front lines because civilians were
being substituted into traditionally military roles-such as an increased military
dependence on civilian scientific corps to develop, maintain, and upgrade weapons
systems. Parks, supra note 14, at 132.
Id. at 75.
113.
114.
Id. at 154; see also Lt. Colonel William J. Fenrick, The Rule of
Proportionalityand Protocol I in Conventional Warfare, 98 MIL. L. REV. 91, 126 (1982)
(hypothesizing that excessively complex, inflexible, or unrealistic restrictions on
warfare will inevitably be abandoned by combatants).
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E. The Gulf War and Beyond: Precision Warfare Comes of Age
Since the Vietnam war, the U.S. military has developed and
acquired in excess of twenty different types of precision guided
115
munitions (PGMs), to the cost of more than forty billion dollars.
PGMs now come in a wide variety of warhead types, guidance
packages, and delivery methods. From short-range glide bombs to
long-range cruise missiles, from television guided anti-tank missiles
to satellite guided "bunker busters," there are now different types of
precision weapons suited for nearly any mission or target. The
development of these munitions, and their acquisition by the U.S.
military, has led to the capacity for precision warfare--"short,
surgical, yet violent mechanized wars"116-that can destroy key
targets from the air while minimizing the humanitarian costs to the
civilian population.
Although precision guided munitions and satellite navigation
systems such as the Global Positioning System (GPS) 117 are driving
this "revolution in military affairs," 118 it is the fusion of those systems
with intelligence and information technology that allows the U.S.
military to be precise in a manner "that makes the sum bigger than
all the parts."1 19 Precision warfare is more than just the capability to
put a bomb through a building window; it is putting a bomb through
the right building window-a feat that implies an underlying
acquisition of actionable intelligence. 120 "Air power ... is inseparable

115.
Belt, supra note 13, at 119. These expenditures have likely increased
substantially since the figures were published in 1996, as the United States has fought
three air campaigns since then-Kosovo, Afghanistan, and the second Gulf War-after
each of which it replaced its stores of PGMs.
116.
RiP & HASIK, supra note 39, at 12.
117.
First launched in 1978, GPS is a constellation of 24 satellites that allow
users to determine their position. By calculating the delay in radio signals sent by
these satellites, handheld GPS receivers on earth can triangulate the receiver's
longitude and latitude. Id. at 68-100; See also Loeb, supra note 105, at 6.
118.
Charles J. Dunlap, The Revolution in Military Affairs: Air Force Legal
Professionals in 21st Century Conflicts, 51 A.F. L. REV. 293, 293 (2001). See generally
Eliot A. Cohen, A Revolution in Warfare, FOREIGN AFF., Mar.-Apr. 1996, at 37.
119.
LAMBETH, supra note 52, at 152.
120.
A number of recent 'friendly fire' mishaps have illustrated the difference
between accuracy-the capability of reliably hitting targets-and precision, the
capability to hit the right target. For example, GPS-guided weapons are only as good as
the target coordinates programmed into them; due to an error caused in part by out-ofdate maps, U.S. bombers dropped three JDAM's on the Chinese Embassy in Kosovo in
1999. In Afghanistan in 2001, three U.S. Special Forces soldiers were killed and the
future President of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai, was injured when a battery failure in a
GPS receiver unit reset the target coordinates to the receiver's own location. See Mark
Thompson, The Tools of War: Expecting a Rerun of Gulf War I? Think Again, Thanks to
High Tech and Smart Bombs, TIME, Oct. 21, 2002 at 52, 54; Mike Toner, Warfare Tests
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from battlespace information and intelligence,''
making precision
more than an exercise in accurate bombing. Precision is based on the
knowledge of "what to hit and where to find it. It is now almost a
clich6 that airpower can kill anything it can see ... it is less widely
122
appreciated that it can kill only what it can see.'
This dramatic improvement in U.S. capabilities was first put to
the test in the 1991 Gulf War. Although the media portrayed the air
campaign as being overwhelmingly precise, only 6.7 percent of bombs
used were actually guided. 123 However, the press's depiction of the
accuracy of these weapons was not overstated. As many as eight-five
124
percent of PGMs reportedly hit within ten feet of their aim points,
while unguided "dumb" bombs hit the target only twenty-five percent
of the time. 125 Although only representing a minority of the total
bombs dropped, the achievement of aerial pinpoint accuracy finally
fulfilled what was sought by ACTS theorists some sixty years prior.
The victory, noted General Michael Dugan, former Chief of Staff for
the U.S. Air Force, "was a vindication of the old concept of precision
12 6
bombing; the technology [has] finally caught up with the doctrine.'
A string of successive regional conflicts during the 1990s allowed
the military to incorporate PGMs further into their operations.
During the 1999 Kosovo conflict, for example, only about thirty-four
percent of the 23,614 bombs dropped 127 were PGMs, but those
weapons struck sixty-four percent of their targets. 128 Kosovo was also
significant in that it marked the introduction of the GBU-31 Joint
Direct Attack Munition (JDAM). No weapon better symbolizes the
aims and capabilities of precision warfare than the JDAM. Although
not as precise as a laser-guided bomb, it is able to steer itself by GPS
to any target, even through inclement weather or thick smoke.
JDAMs can be dropped as far as fifteen miles away from the target
and from altitudes exceeding 35,000 feet. 129 This stand-off capability
offers some degree of protection to pilots, who would otherwise have

New Technology: Afghan Conflict Proves Effectiveness, Exposes Pitfalls of Smart
Weapons, ATLANTA JOURNAL CONSTITUTION, Sept. 2, 2002, at 4A. Such errors are
known as "targeting process error" in military jargon. See Michael Puttr6, SatelliteGuided Munitions: Highly accurate yet affordable strike weapons, proved in
Afghanistan, are the latest upgrades to America's arsenal, SCI. AM., Feb. 2003, at 66,
73.
121.
LAMBETH, supra note 52, at 9.
122.
Id.
123.
RiP & HASIK, supra note 39, at 212.
124.
Belt, supra note 13, at 117.
125.
Infeld, supra note 111, at 128.
126.
Michael Kelly, The American Way of War: The Third of Three Essays on the
Revolution in Air Power, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, June 2002, at 16-17.
127.
NORDEEN, supra note 107, at 257.
128.
Belt, supra note 13, at 135.
129.
Puttr6, supra note 120, at 68-69.
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to release a laser guided weapon close to their target and within
reach of air defenses.
JDAMs are designed to be accurate to within ten to fifteen
meters, 130 but some sources suggest they may in fact regularly impact
within four to six meters of their target coordinates, 13 1 depending on
the quality of the GPS signal. 132 Developed as "a moderately accurate
weapon that would cost so little that it could replace almost all
unguided bombs,"'1 33 the JDAM has succeeded in becoming an almost
ubiquitous weapon for the U.S. military. Assembled from a
conventional "dumb" one- or two-thousand pound bomb and a strapon guidance unit and fins, the JDAM costs as little as $18,000.134
This meager cost has allowed the military to purchase them in vast
numbers, 135 raising the possibility that unguided bombs may
eventually be completely phased out in favor of guided weapons.
During more recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, the
majority of munitions employed were PGMs. About sixty percent of
all bombs dropped in Afghanistan were guided, 136 nearly all of them
GPS-guided JDAMs. 137 Similarly, Administration officials stated that
they were aiming for a one hundred percent PGM usage rate in the
opening days of the Second Gulf War, 138 although the actual
utilization rate was reportedly about seventy percent. 139 Additionally,
JDAMs have now been adapted to fit into U.S. heavy bombers, each of
which hold either sixteen or twenty-four of the 2000-pound version of
this weapon. Placing more guided bombs on fewer aircraft allows for
more targets to be attacked with fewer aircrews-reducing the risk to
U.S. servicemen by putting less of them in harm's way. In the Gulf
War, explained CENTCOM 140 commanding General Tommy Franks,

130.
RIP & HASIK, supra note 39, at 236.
131.
Loeb, supra note 105.
132.
Planned upgrades will reportedly also improve the accuracy of the JDAM to
a 3m (10ft) CEP by boosting the signal through ground-based differential corrections
and adding an infrared seeker. RIP & HASIK, supra note 39, at 238-40.
133.
Belt, supra note 13, at 122.
134.
Afghanistan: First Lessons, JANE'S DEF. WKLY., Dec.19, 2001, at 18-21. This
cost includes only the guidance system and fins-the actual "dumb" bomb itself would
cost another $1000-5000, depending on its size. See Puttr6, supra note 120, at 73.
135.
RIP & HASIK, supranote 39, at 236.
136.
Michael Moran, Gulf War Lessons, Learned or Not, MSNBC.coM, at
http://www.msnbc.com/news/852294.asp; see also Thompson, supra note 120, at 54.
137.
Puttr6, supra note 120, at 70.
138.
Thompson, supra note 120, at 52.
139.
Terry McCarthy, What Ever Happened to the Republican Guard?, TIME,
May 12, 2003, at 38, 39.
140.
The United States operates all of its armed services from a single combat
command structure that is organized around geographic regions. Central Command,
known as CENTCOM, is responsible for much of the Middle East, including the
Persian Gulf.
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"we used 10 airframes to a target. Now we assign two targets to an
41
aircraft."'
In the coming years, the Air Force is looking for ways further to
increase their lethality against targets, while decreasing collateral
damage. One of the avenues being pursued is the development of a
variety of smaller guided weapons. The current 1000- and 2000pound JDAMs will soon be joined by a 500-pound version. This
smaller bomb would have a number of advantages over its larger
brethren. First, assuming similar fuse and warhead selection, it poses
less chance that an attack would injure civilians in the vicinity of the
target. Additionally, smaller munitions allow more bombs to be
carried on a single aircraft, reducing the number of missions that
need to be flown and the corresponding risk to aircrews. Other, even
smaller bombs are in development, such as the 250-pound Next
Generation Small Diameter Bomb (SDB). Less than six feet long and
six inches in diameter, the SDB has the same penetration capabilities
as a 2000-pound bomb, but uses only fifty pounds of explosive. 142 The
SDB could attack eighty-five percent of targets now struck with
thousand-pound bombs, 14 3 even further reducing both the risk of
144
unintended damage and the number of missions to be flown.
In sum, a number of conclusions can be drawn about the
development of both the law and technology of aerial bombing. This
type of warfare has been plagued by problems of inaccuracy and
target discrimination until the very recent past. Difficulties with
navigation, weather, enemy air defenses, and bomb accuracy
prompted combatants in World War II to engage in area bombing to
ensure their targets were destroyed. Although the Hague conventions
addressed many of these problems in requiring only "reasonable care"
in the conduct of an attack, the behavior of both sides fell well below
even this standard. In the end, legal considerations such as exercising
discriminate attacks against identifiable targets were secondary to
the military necessity of ensuring that damage was inflicted upon the
45
enemy's capacity to wage war or upon civilian morale.'

141.
Thompson, supra note 120, at 53.
142.
Small Diameter Bomb, GlobalSecurity.Org, at http://www.globalsecurity.org/
military/systems/munitions/sdb.htm.
143.
Ron Laurenzo, B-2 To Drop More, Smaller Smart Bombs, DEF. WEEK, Dec.
23, 2002, at 3. Once placed into the inventory in 2004, as many as eighty 500-pound
JDAM's (GBU-38) could be dropped against different targets from a single B-2.
Similarly, a B-2 could potentially hold 'hundreds' of SDB's, barring other practical
considerations such as length of time the bomb bay doors could remain open. Id.
144.
Lorenzo Cortes, Britain Interested in SDB, But Boeing Concentrating
Efforts on Air Force Use First, DEF. DAiLY, June 6, 2003, at 0; see also
Globalsecurity.org, supra note 142.
145.
Post-war studies of bombing accuracy finally disproved the myth of the
effectiveness of morale bombing. The U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS)
established that the targets whose destruction contributed the most to the end of the
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The collective shock over the scope of destruction in World War
II has effectively kept the standard of customary law at its pre-1939
state. Historically, military necessity has trumped international legal
principles when there is a sufficiently vital natiomial interest at stake.
In World War II, the dire threat to national security served as
justification for bombing wide areas, despite the harm to civilian
populations. The technological developments seen in recent years,
however, have resolved the problems that caused area bombing to be
employed. The introduction of weapons capable of reliably hitting
specific targets has helped to overcome the root problems that drove
World War II's "crisis of distinction." Carpet bombing was employed
only when both sides believed that respect for noncombatants and
hitting the target were mutually exclusive; precision warfare has now
made the accomplishment of both goals obtainable.

III. THE RULES OF WARFARE

There is general agreement on several basic customary norms
that guide the use of military force under the law of war-military
necessity, proportionality, distinction, and humanity. 146 These
doctrines are derived from a number of different sources, including
international treaties and customary international law. These
interlocking principles serve both functional and humanitarian
goals, 147 but are unanimous in their adherence to a single core
value-that "[t]he right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the
148
enemy is not unlimited."
A. Military Necessity
Of the customary norms, the first, necessity, is "the principle
which justifies measures of regulated force not forbidden by
international law which are indispensable for securing the prompt
submission of the enemy, with the least possible expenditures of
economic and human resources. '149 The doctrine of limiting wartime

war were not German population centers, but instead specific military facilities, such
as transport facilities and oil infrastructure. See LAWS OF WAR, supra note 4, at 158.
146.
OPERATIONAL LAW, supra note 10, at 8; see also VICK, supra note 7, at 42.
147.
OPERATIONAL LAW, supra note 10, at 8.
148.
Hague IV, supra note 26, art. 22; see also Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1997, art. 35(1), 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 21
[hereinafter Protocol I].
149.
VICK, supra note 7, at 42 (quoting U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW-THE CONDUCT OF ARMED CONFLICT AND AIR OPERATIONS, Air
Force Pamphlet 110-31, November 1976, at
1-3(a)l.). This definition suggests that a
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attacks to those objectives directly linked to the enemy's ability to
wage war was first codified in the 1863 Lieber Code. 15 0 "Military
necessity admits of all direct destruction of life or limb of armed
enemies, and of other persons whose destruction is incidentally
unavoidable in the armed contests of the war."15 1 Modern definitions
have emphasized the efficient use of force against those targetsmilitary objectives-that have a substantial effect upon the enemy's
15 2
ability to fight.
Most.modern international efforts to clarify relevant terms such as
"military objective" and "military necessity" have not been successful.
States have historically preferred to define such terms themselves' 53 in
light of the potential impacts an adverse construction could have upon
their ability to conduct operations. The United States has generally
relied on Protocol I's definition of a military objective as being "limited
to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose, or use make
an effective contribution to military action whose total or partial
destruction, capture or neutralization in the circumstances ruling at
the time, offers a definite military advantage.' 15 4 U.S. Operational Law
Handbooks indicate military objectives "by their nature" include all
sites or items capable of direct combat operations, or facilitation of such
operations-for example, combatants, vehicles, fortifications, supply
depots. 155 Objectives which contribute "by their location" would include
terrain features that are critical for the success of military operations,
such as narrow mountain passes and bridges over which a main supply
route would pass. 15 6 Objectives "by their purpose" would be dual-use
items used in direct support of military operations, such as civilian
buses used to carry troops or civilian factories producing arms or arms

balancing of target selection, means of attack, and an assessment of the probability of
success are required in order to insure force is directed only at military targets. See
Infeld, supra note 111, at 121.
150.
See Parks, supra note 14, at 7.
151.
Lieber Code, supra note 1, art. 15.
152.
U.S. Army Field Manuals provide that "There is no prohibition of general
application against bombardment from the air of combat troops, defended places, or
other legitimate military objectives." See U.S. ARMY FIELD MANUAL 27-10, LAW OF
LAND WARFARE, art. 42 [hereinafter FM 27-10].
Furthermore, military necessity allows force to be used in self-defense against
those forces who commit hostile acts or demonstrate hostile intent against U.S. forces,
providing, in the words of the Caroline standard, that "the necessity of that self-defense
is instant, overwhelming and leaving no choice of means and no moment for
deliberation." U.S. ARMY FIELD MANUAL 27-100, LEGAL SUPPORT TO OPERATIONS, Mar.

1, 2001, § 8.2.5 [hereinafter FM 27-100].
153.
LAWS OF WAR, supra note 4, at 140. The United States is no different, and
prefers a liberal construction of "military objective" to include non-military sites that
are being used for military purposes, or otherwise contributing to the war effort. VICK,
supranote 7, at 50.
154.
OPERATIONAL LAW, supranote 10, at 8.
155.
Id.
156.
Id.
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components. 157 Objectives "by their use" could include dual-use civilian
items adapted to a military use, such as enemy headquarters located in
a school, an enemy supply dump in a house, or a hotel billeting
troops. 158 These definitions of necessity are not exclusive, however. An
attacker could conceivably bomb any target in which that attacker
could articulate the definite advantage to be gained. The baseline
requirement is only that "[t]here must be some reasonable connection
between the destruction of property [or individuals] and..the
overcoming of the enemy forces."'15 9 In customary practice,, military
necessity almost always justifies the targeting of military units and
bases, power sources, industry, transportation, and command and
160
control (C2) systems.
Although the United States has never ratified Protocol I, it has
designated Article 52 as one of the sections it regards as either
"legally binding customary international law, or acceptable practice,
although not legally binding."'161 Protocol I's limitation of military
objectives to "effective contribution to military action"'162 and "definite
military advantage,"'16 3 however, has been criticized by military
lawyers for its exclusion of other military gains that cannot be
directly quantified. 164 Parks offers up the 1942 Doolittle Raids on
Tokyo and the 1972 Linebacker bombing campaign on Hanoi as
examples of military operations that generated a morale, diplomatic,
or political gain, rather than a discernible capture of territory. 165 To
exclude gains other than the physical capture of ground is to ignore
much of the nature of armed combat; as suggested by Parks, "Wars
are not simply acts of violence. They are acts of persuasion or of
discussion; and although the threat of destruction is normally a
necessary part of the persuading process, such destruction is only
1 66
exceptionally regarded as an end to itself."'

157.
Id.
158.
Id.
Michael N. Schmitt, Bellum Americanum: The U.S. View of Twenty-First
159.
Century War and its Possible Implications for the Law of Armed Conflict, 19 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 1051, 1083 (1998); see also FM 27-10, supra note 152, at 56, 58.
160.
Infeld, supra note 111, at 122.
161.
OPERATIONAL LAW, supra note 10, at 13. Military necessity was also cited
by the International Court of Justice in Nicaragua v. United States as binding
customary international law. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14, 122 (June 27). "[E]ven if the United States activities in question had been
carried on in strict compliance with the canons of necessity and proportionality, they
would not thereby become lawful .. " Id.
162.
Protocol I, supra note 148, art. 52(2).
163.
Id.
164.
Parks, supra note 14, at 141-43.
165.
Id.
166.
Id.
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In judging whether the connection between the target struck and
military gain has been met, the commander's action is evaluated only
in light of the information available at that time. 167 Known as the
Rendulic Rule, 168 this standard generally allows the destruction of
property on the basis of urgent military necessity, 169 provided the
commander did not rush to judgment. As suggested by U.S.
Operational Law Handbooks, before claiming necessity, the
commander must consider factors such as available time and
personnel. and prevailing combat conditions, and then "gather
information to determine whether the target [is] a military objective
and [whether] the incidental damage would [] be appropriate" before
170
acting "reasonably" on the information.
B. Discrimination(Distinction)
Discrimination is defined as "the necessity of distinguishing
between combatants, who may be attacked, and noncombatants,
against whom an intentional attack may not be directed, and between
legitimate military targets and civilian objects."'1 71 It dictates that
parties to a conflict shall direct their operations only against
combatants and military objectives 1 72 and abstain from destruction
1 73
not "imperatively demanded by the necessities of war."'
Discrimination generally precludes intentional destruction and
collateral damage that is clearly disproportionate to the military
advantage gained in the attack of military objectives. 174 Additionally,

167.
OPERATIONAL LAW, supra note 10, at 10.
168.
German General Lothar Rendulic was charged by the Nuremberg Court
with carrying out a 'scorched earth campaign' in the Norwegian province of Finnmark.
In announcing his acquittal, the court stated:
There is evidence . . . that there was no military necessity for this destruction
and devastation. An examination of the facts in retrospect can well sustain this
conclusion. But we are obliged to judge the situation as it appeared to the
defendant at the time .... The course of a military operation by the enemy is
loaded with uncertainties .... It is our considered opinion that the conditions,
as they appeared to the defendant at the time were sufficient upon which he
could honestly conclude that urgent military necessity warranted the decision
made.
Parks, supra note 14, at 3.
169.
FM 27-10, supra note 152, arts. 56, 58.
170.
OPERATIONAL LAw, supra note 10, at 10.
171.
GULF WAR REPORT, supra note 6, at 611.
172.
Protocol I, supra note 148, art. 48; OPERATIONAL LAw, supra note 10, at 10.
173.
Hague IV, supranote 26, art. 23(g).
174.
GULF WAR REPORT, supra note 6, at 611. In addition to its ties to
proportionality, discrimination is intertwined with the principle of military necessity,
as it prohibits the intentional destruction of civilian objects unconnected to military
gain. See also GREEN, supra note 8, at 120 (suggesting incidental injuries to
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discrimination forbids deliberate attacks against cultural or
humanitarian sites; Article 27 of Hague IV offers protection from
attack to "buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, or charitable
purposes, historic monuments, hospitals, and places where the sick
and wounded are collected, provided they are not being used at the
175
time for military purposes."'

Discrimination also establishes a burden of care in the selection
and use of certain weapon types; opposing sides may not use weapons
that are incapable of discrimination between combatants and
civilians. 176 Protocol I forbids "indiscriminate attacks,"'177 which cannot
be "directed at a specific military objective,"'178 or "employ a method or
179
means of combat the effects of which cannot be limited as required.
Alternatively, indiscriminate attacks are those which generate
excessive collateral damage in relation to military advantage gained' 80
and "consequently in each case are of a nature to strike military
181
objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction."'
Discrimination is tied to the intent of the attacker and defined not "by
the amount of the devastation or the number of deaths, but by... what
82
is deliberately intended and directly done."'
Protocol I, although never ratified by the United States, contains
several provisions applicable to discrimination that have been

generally adopted by the U.S. military as non-binding acceptable
practice. Article 48 requires that "the Parties to the conflict shall at
all times distinguish between the civilian population and

noncombatants are acceptable providing harm done is proportional to military gain
achieved).
175.
Hague IV, supra note 26, art. 27; see also GREEN, supra note 8, at 120.
176.
See Schmitt, supra note 159, at 1075 (noting that this principle may become
more difficult to implement as line between combatants and non-combatants blurs).
177.
Protocol I, supra note 148, art. 51(4).
178.
Id. art. 51(4)a.
179.
Id. art. 51(4)c.
180.
Id. art. 51(5)b.
181.
OPERATIONAL LAW, supra note 10, at 10. An excellent example of an
indiscriminate weapons system is the Scud ballistic missile, which was used by the
Iraqis to attack Israel in the 1991 Gulf War. This weapon is incapable of accuracy that
would allow the proper selection of military targets over the civilian population-its
CEP is sufficiently large to make any degree of discrimination effectively impossible.
182.
Parks, supra note 14, at 5. For this purpose, all U.S. weapons, weapons
systems, and munitions must be reviewed by military attorneys to determine their
legality under this requirement. See OPERATIONAL LAW, supra note 10, at 12. This
review determines whether the weapon is impermissibly indiscriminate by querying
whether the suffering caused by the use of the weapon "needless, superfluous, or
grossly disproportionate to the advantage" gained by its use. Id. at 12-13. One author
notes that what is 'disproportionate' is often subjective, however. For example, a
hooked bayonet developed by the Pentagon in the 1960's was dismissed by lawyers who
felt it to be too cruel, but weapons capable of inflicting mass devastation-such as
nuclear weapons--remain in the military's arsenal. Esther Schrader, War, on Advice of
Counsel, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2002, at Al.
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combatants. . . and accordingly shall direct their operations only
against military objectives.' 8 3 Article 51 echoes these protections,
providing the civilian population "general protection" against military
operations, 8 4 and requiring that civilians "shall not be the object of
attack,"'8 5 whether in order to kill or to spread terror.1 8 6 This
protection lasts so long as civilians do not take a "direct" role in
87
hostilities.'
Most importantly, Protocol I imposes a precautionary duty in
bombardment; Article 57 states that attackers must "[t]ake all
feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack
with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing incidental
loss of civilian life, injury to civilian and damage to civilian
objects."' 8 8 Attackers must verify their target, take due precautions
to minimize collateral damage, refrain from indiscriminate attacks,
and abort if excessive casualties would result.'8 9 In the case of doubt
about whether an individual is a combatant or noncombatant,
Protocol I requires the attacker to treat him as a civilian. 190
Senior military lawyers have expressed their reservations about
the above requirement that the attacker, not the defender, take
precautions to minimize civilian casualties. They believe this
standard departs from the provision of customary law establishing
that civilian casualties from bombardment are the responsibility of
the defender, providing the attacker has exercised "reasonable care."
The standards set out in Articles 48 through 58 of Protocol I, argues
Parks, "clearly were intended to raise the standard of care for the

183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
as follows:

Protocol I, supra note 148, art. 48.
Id. art. 51(1).
Id. art. 51(2).
Id.
The ICRC interpretation of the scope of "direct" involvement in hostilities is

'Direct' participation means acts of war which by their nature of purpose are
likely to cause actual harm ....

It is only during such participation that a

civilian loses his immunity and becomes a legitimate target. Once he ceases to
participate, the civilian regains his right to the protection under this section.
Parks, supra note 14, at 118. Senior military lawyers object to this narrowly construed
view of combatant status, as it would make guerillas or partisans within the civilian
population immune to attack the moment they cease fighting. This 'revolving door'
definition of combatant would allow them to hide among civilians and cross the line
separating the two as they engage and then disengage in combat operations. See id. at
117-19.
188.
Protocol I, supra note 148, art. 57(2)ii.
189.
Id. art. 57(2). It is important to note, however, that the presence of civilians
does not make a target immune from attack-as established by Hague IV; legitimate
targets may be struck at any time. An attacker must only exercise 'ordinary care' in
attacking the target-he is not responsible for the actions of the defender. See Infeld,
supra note 111, at 120-21.
190.
Protocol I, supra note 148, art. 50.
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attacker while lowering it for the defender, thereby shifting the
burden for minimization of collateral civilian casualties to the party
with the least control over the civilian population." 191 The duty to
protect the civilian from unnecessary harm is a shared one; the
attacker's role is to exercise reasonable care and to direct his attacks
only against military targets. However, it isprimarily the defender's
192
duty to control the civilian population to prevent injury.
According to Protocol I, the parties must "endeavor to remove the
civilian population, individual civilians and civilian objects under
their control from the vicinity of military objectives," and "[a]void
locating military objectives within or near densely populated
areas."'193 This obligation stems from the defender's unhindered
access to the population and his ability to remove them from the
proximity of military objectives. 194 Furthermore, "[t]he presence or
movements of the civilian population or individual civilians shall not
be used to render certain points or areas immune from military
1 95
operations, in particular in attempts to shield military objectives."'
Legitimate actions taken by the defender-such as the
dispersion of production facilities, the use of camouflage, and the
emplacement of air defenses-may further shift the division of
responsibility for protecting non-combatants towards the defender.
Parks notes "[t]he purpose of enemy defenses is not necessarily to
cause aircraft losses; the defender has accomplished his mission if he
makes the attacker miss his target."'1 96 Thus, these actions can be
viewed as a deliberate effort to cause an attack to be less
discriminate-a knowing effort to place the defender's civilian
197
population at greater risk in order to protect the military objective.
Parks concludes that these actions are an "intervening cause for
which the attacker is not responsible.' 198 As a result, the duty of care
of the attacker is reduced because the defender is actively trying to
undermine his efforts. "A party to a conflict which places its own
citizen in positions of danger by failing to carry out the separation of
military activities from civilian activities necessarily accepts, under
international law, the results of otherwise lawful attacks upon valid
19 9
military objectives in their territory."'

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

Parks, supra note 14, at 201-02.
Id. at 55.
Protocol I, supra note 148, art. 58(a)-(b).
Id. art. 51; GULF WAR REPORT, supra note 6, at 616.
Protocol I, supranote 148, art. 51(7).
Parks, supranote 14, at 191.
Id. at 29, 52.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 162.
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Military lawyers further note their objections to Protocol I's broad
construction of the status of "noncombatant," which includes every
civilian not currently involved in combat operations. 200 The United
States has opposed this definition, which excludes as legitimate targets
civilians essential to the war effort of the enemy, such as workers in the
defense industry or scientists developing weapons systems. Protocol I
fails to account for what Parks calls the "commingling of the civilian
population and civilian objects with military objectives, and/or the dual
'20 1
use of certain objects for civilian and defense-related purposes."
Instead, the United States supports an alternative view that "[e]conomic
targets that indirectly but effectively support and sustain the enemy's
warfighting capability

may . . . be attacked, ' 20 2 a

stance that is

consistent with the practice of nations in both World War I and World
War II.
Protocol I's most direct protections for the civilian do the most to
confirm Parks's suspicions that it is intended directly to disadvantage
the attacker. Article 51(8) provides that violations of the Protocol by
one party do not release the opposing party from its obligations, 20 3 a
provision that seems to punish the complying party for an adversary's
bad faith. Furthermore, forcing the attacker to deal with a
presumption that all targets of a questionable nature are
noncombatants, 20 4 as Article 50 of Protocol I provides, requires the
attacker to confirm the identity of individuals in an area outside of
his direct control. This is rarely practical-because of speed and
altitude, an airborne attacker is not in a position to identify
individuals in target zones, unless, as Parks notes, the individual
"obligingly waves a rifle or shoots at him. ' 20 5 The customary provision
that the attacker need only exercise "reasonable care" in attacking
the target reflects this reality; Protocol I's higher standards do not.
Likewise, Protocol I's requirement that in case of doubt about the
military or civilian nature of a cultural site-such as a church and
hospital 206-offers
a significant advantage to an unscrupulous
defender by encouraging him to place potential military targets
within cultural sites.

200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Id. at 134.
Id. at 152.
Schmitt, supra note 158, at 1076.
Protocol I, supra note 148, art. 51(8).
Id. art. 50.
Parks, supra note 14, at 116.

206.

Protocol I, supra note 148, art. 52(3); see also GULF WAR REPORT, supra

note 6, at 616.
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C. Proportionality
The doctrine of proportionality prohibits military action in which
the negative effects of an attack outweigh the military gain caused by
the damage to the enemy, 20 7 as well as any means of attack that is
"unreasonable or excessive. '20 8 Protocol I best reflects this principle,
prohibiting any "attack which may be expected to cause incidental
loss of civilian life . . . which would be excessive in relation to the

concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. ' 20 9 In providing
that attacks against legitimate targets are permissible so long as
civilian deaths are not excessive, proportionality implies that some
degree of collateral damage is unavoidable. 2 10 In this regard,
proportionality "accommodates the needs of humanity with the
practical inevitabilities of warfare"2 11 in its attempts to minimize
noncombatant deaths. Additionally, by focusing its analysis strictly
on military gain, proportionality recognizes the legitimacy of
attacking dual-use sites, such as roads, ports, or power plants.
The standard for establishing the proportionality of an attack
under Article 57 of Protocol I turns on an evaluation of reasonable
care. 2 12 Historically, collateral damage has been the product of three
factors-a lack of full knowledge about the target, an inability to
direct only the minimum amount of force needed to destroy the
target, and an inability to guarantee the weapon hits only the
target. 2 13 Therefore, when making an evaluation of proportionality,
an observer must consider the care taken by the attacker in the
target selection, the method of the strike, and the determination of
the strategic or tactical advantage to be gained from the target's
destruction.2 14 Planners must determine if the loss of life that would

207.

GULF WAR REPORT, supra note 6, at 611; see also Fenrick, supra note 114,

at 125.
208.
Bonafede, supra note 10, at 168.
209.
Protocol I, supra note 148, art. 51(5)b. Proportionality was also cited by the
International Court of Justice in Nicaragua v. United States as binding customary
international law. See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J.
14, 122 (June 27).
210.
Id.
211.
Fenrick, supra note 114, at 92.
212.
OPERATIONAL LAW, supra note 10, at 9; see also Protocol I, supra note 148,
art. 57(1).
213.
Schmitt, supra note 158, at 1080.
214.
Randy W. Stone, Protecting Civilians During Operation Allied Force: The
Enduring Importance of the ProportionalResponse and NATO's Use of Armed Force in
Kosovo, 50 CATH. U.L. REV. 501, 522 (2001).
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result from a proposed attack would be excessive in relation to the
"concrete and direct" military advantage that would be gained. 2 15
In making this determination before launching an attack, a
commander must act "reasonably," taking all prudent steps to ensure
that targets are identified as military objectives and that they may be
attacked without disproportionate collateral damage. 216 Because the
Rendulic Rule is applied, the determination of reasonableness is
based only on the information available to the commander at the
time.2 17 Article 57 of Protocol I requires planners to cancel an attack
when they know disproportionate casualties would result,2 18 meaning
that a violation of this doctrine would only result with the launching
of an attack that the commander knows or should have known would
cause disproportionate collateral damage. Schmitt notes, however,
the increasing complexity of determining which attacks would have
disproportionate results, based on the uncertain nature of
intelligence, wider range of available weapons, anid difficulty in
identifying the target. 2 19 However, this uncertainty as to the probable
results of a strike does not allow one combatant to use the principle of
proportionality as a shield against another. Warfare is "not subject to
some sort of 'fairness doctrine' and neither the law of war ... nor the
concept of proportionality ... imposes a legal or moral obligation on a
nation to sacrifice manpower, firepower, or technological superiority
'220
over an opponent.
One of the most difficult legal questions in considering what is
"disproportionate" is how attenuated the harm caused may be in
relation to the initial strike. For example, in a sophisticated and
urbanized society, it is often difficult to determine in advance how an
attack on a single subsystem will affect a greater network. 22 1 Both
military and civil sectors of society may rely on common power
sources, transportation, and telecommunications infrastructure-and
a military attack on those systems, although justifiable under
military necessity, may have far-reaching repercussions on the
civilian sector. One such example is deaths caused by a strike against
a power plant that keeps the national air defense system in
operation. If civilians died not because of the bomb itself, but because
the destruction of the plant caused life support equipment in the

215.

OPERATIONAL LAW, supra note 10, at 9; see also FM 27-10, supra note 152,

art. 41.

216.
FM 27-10, supra note 152, art. 41; OPERATIONAL LAW, supra note 10, at 9.
217.
OPERATIONAL LAW, supranote 10, at 10.
218.
Protocol I, supra note 148, art. 57(2)b.
Schmitt, supranote 159, at 1080-81.
219.
Infeld, supra note 111, at 119-20.
220.
221.
VICK, supra note 7, at 50; see also Eliot A. Cohen, The Mystique of U.S. Air
Power, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 109; Schmitt, supra note 159, at 1082.
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critical care ward of a nearby hospital to stop working, should those
222
deaths count towards a finding of disproportionality?
As yet, no consensus has been reached on how far removed from
the initial attack harm should be before being included. Some
scholars have suggested that the increasing connectivity of network223
driven societies will promote a macro-level view of proportionality,
while the U.S. military maintains a narrower interpretation whereby
only directly-caused civilian deaths are considered. 224 It seems most
plausible, however, that a utilitarian approach consistent with
current law will eventually be adopted. For example, an analysis
might first turn to whether the attacker had employed reasonable
care in executing the attack, second, whether the attack was
disproportionate based on the information available to the attacker at
the time, and, finally, whether the defender failed to take any
intervening action which would have protected its citizens.
D. Humanity (Unnecessary Suffering)
The U.S. military's Operational Law Handbook notes that one of
the primary purposes of the law of war is the "protect[ion of] both
combatants and noncombatants from unnecessary suffering. '225 First
defined by the St. Petersberg Declaration of 1868, the principle of
humanity forbids means of war that "uselessly aggravate the
sufferings of disabled men, or render their death inevitable. '22 6
Article 23 of Hague IV represents the best codification of this
doctrine, forbidding the "employ[ment] of arms, projectiles or
material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering. '22 7 This
restriction has been held to outlaw weapons that cause unnecessary
destruction-such as barbed lances or projectiles filled with glass, 228
but it also upholds the immunity of noncombatants by forbidding any
superfluous "suffering, injury, or destruction" not required for the
22 9
accomplishment of the objective.

222.
Cohen, supra note 221, at 121.
223.
Schmitt, supra note 159, at 1082.
224.
VICK, supra note 7, at 50 n.24.
225.
OPERATIONAL LAW, supra note 10, at 8. A minority of scholars have
recognized only three customary principles-military necessity, discrimination, and
proportionality-excluding humanity. See Belt, supra note 13, at 156.
226. Declaration of St. Petersberg, Nov. 29, 1868, available at http://www.
yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/lawofwar/decpeter.htm.
227. Hague IV, supra note 26, art. 23(e); see also Protocol I, supra note 148, art.
35(2).
228. OPERATIONAL LAW, supra note 10, at 9; see also Schmitt, supra note 159, at
1084-85.
229. OPERATIONAL LAw, supra note 10, at 13; see also Fenrick, supra note 114,
at 93.
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The concept of humanity has also been interpreted to forbid acts
30
and although
that violate "the dictates of public conscience,"2
necessity, 23 '
military
and
proportionality
by
subsumed
somewhat
humanity parallels the doctrine of discrimination as it forbids the use
23 2
There
of indiscriminate weapons incapable of hitting only targets.
always
must
armies
whether
on
however,
has been no agreement,
23 3
Some
employ the weapon with the least risk of collateral damage.
be
always
should
munitions
guided
believe the use of precision
any
opposed
has
States
the
United
but
law,
required by international
initiative to make precision weaponry a requirement of the law of war
and favors a policy of more flexible weapons choice. 23 4 Relatively few
nations possess sufficient quantities of these weapons or the
capability to employ them, however, and it seems illogical to presume
that the handful of states with precision weapons-such as the
United States, Britain, and to a lesser degree, Russia-should be held
to a higher standard of law.

IV. THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

A. Wvhat Are RoE?
The Rules of Engagement (RoE) are a set of rules for the conduct
of military operations which impose political, operational, and legal
limitations upon commanders. 235 They ensure compliance with

Schmitt, supra note 159, at 1084.
230.
Id.
231.
Protocol I, supra note 148, art. 51(4).
232.
VICK, supra note 7, at 44; see Belt, supra note 13, at 174-75 (finding that
233.
there was a customary norm for the use of precision weapons in cities). But see Infeld,
supra note 111, at 140-41 (concluding that the laws of war do not require nations with
precision weapons to use them in all circumstances).
VICK, supra note 7, at 45. The author notes, however, that the United
234.
States has generally employed precision weapons for "reasons of politics or military
effectiveness." Id.
FM 27-100, supra note 152, § 8.2.3. The formal Department of Defense
235.
definition of RoE is "directives issued by competent military authority which delineate
the circumstances and limitations under which United States Forces will initiate
and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered." Lt. Col. W.A.
Stafford (USMC), How to Keep Military Personnel from Going to Jail for Doing the
Right Thing: Jurisdiction,ROE & the Rules of Deadly Force, ARMY LAW., Sept. 2000, at
3; see also FM 27-100, supra note 152, at § 8.2.2. According to U.S. Army Field
Manuals, "RoE are driven by three sets of considerations, policy, legal, and military."
The manuals note that these three considerations often overlap; "rules implementing
strategic policy decisions may serve and operation or tactical military goal while
simultaneously bringing U.S. forces in compliance with domestic or international law."
Id. at § 8.2.2.
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international and domestic law and serve to guide soldiers in the
absence of direct orders from their command authority. 236 In a
practical sense, "[ROE] are the commander's rules for the use of
force ...

specify[ing]

the circumstances and limitations in which

[they] may engage the enemy," 237 and are a subset of a larger group
of permissible military options allowed by the law of war.238
It is U.S. military policy to comply with the law of war to the
extent that is "practicable and feasible. '239 This is instituted through
a number of Department of Defense directives, including the
Standing Rules of Engagement (SRoE). The SRoE, also known as
Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3121.01, is a permanent doctrine first
issued

by the

Joint

Chiefs

of Staff in

October

1994.240

The

unclassified enclosure to the SRoE mandates that U.S. forces must
comply with the law "in the conduct of military operations involving
armed conflict, no matter how the conflict may be characterized
under international law."'24 1 Additionally, it provides that "in those
circumstances when armed conflict, under international law, does not
exist, law of armed conflict principles may nevertheless be applied as
2' 42
a matter of national policy.
Although the international legal factors that drive RoE are the
most obvious, RoE reflect political realities as much as they do legal
requirements. The President, in his role as Commander in Chief, often
restricts the scope of military action or limits the type of force employed
in order to mesh with a policy position or to reflect political or
international sensitivities. The United States recognizes that war at its
core is "an instrument of policy, [and so] politically imposed rules of

Although generalities have been made available in the press, the precise rules of
engagement are "typically classified due to security reasons," as precise knowledge of
the rules U.S. forces fight by might provide an advantage to an adversary. Elaine M.
Grossman, Key Command Banned Nearly All Attacks on Afghan Roads, Bridges,
INSIDE THE PENTAGON, Jan. 9, 2003, at 1.

236.
Lt. Commander Guy R. Phillips, Rules of Engagement: A Primer, ARMY
LAW., July 1993, at 4, 7-8.
237.
Major Dawn R. Eflein, A Case Study of Rules of Engagement in Joint
Operations: The Air Force Shootdown of Army Helicopters in Operation Provide
Comfort, 44 A.F. L. REV. 33, 36 (1998).
238.
Phillips, supra note 236, at 6.
239.
OPERATIONAL LAW, supra note 10, at 10; see also Department of Defense
Directive 5100.77, Law of War Program, Dec. 9, 1998, at § 4.1 (indicating that it is
Department of Defense Policy to ensure that "the law of war obligations of the United
States are observed and enforced by the DoD components").
240.
William M. Arkin, The Rules of Engagement, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2002, at
Mi.
241.
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction, Standing Rules of
Engagement for U.S. Forces, CJCSI 3121.01A, Jan. 15, 2000, unclassified Enclosure A,
& l(g) [hereinafter, CJCSI 3121.01A].
242.
Major Richard M. Whitaker, Civilian Protection Law in Military
Operations:An Essay, ARMY LAW., Nov. 1996, at 3, 5.

AERIAL PRECISION WARFARE

20041

engagement will always be a handmaiden of force employment
decisions to ensure that the manner in which force is applied conforms
to political objectives and perceived risks. '24 3 Thus, restrictions on
soldiers' actions established in the RoE address the reality that
"decisions made by soldiers can have strategic, [and] political
244
implications."
B. How Are RoE Implemented?
In order to uphold national law of war obligations and comply
with policy directives, the U.S. military has drawn its corps of
attorneys, known as the Judge Advocate General (JAG), into much of
its decision making process. Throughout the U.S. armed forces
military attorneys often sit at the right hand of military commanders,
drafting rules of engagement and approving targets. 245 This role
stretches back to the aftermath of the My Lai incident, when the
Joint Chiefs of Staff first required that all operational plans,
contingency plans, and rules of engagement be reviewed by Judge
Advocates and be found in compliance with the international law of
246
war and U.S. domestic law.
By Operation Just Cause in 1989, JAGs were serving in planning
cells and operations centers, 247 and since the first Gulf War in 1991
they have been major participants in RoE, targeting, and other
crucial operational matters. Their purpose is to provide legal
guidance to commanders as to limitations affecting the conduct of
military operations. This is especially needed in situations involving
targeting, where the facts are not always clear, and the obligations
under the law of war are most critical. This practice of "operational
law,"248 according to Department of Defense regulations, "places
Judge Advocates firmly within the command and control of
operations." 249 "I would say Judge Advocates are more intimately

243.
LAMBETH, supra note 52, at 50; see also CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS
LEARNED (CALL), ROE Training, Newsletter 96-6, § 2 [hereinafter CALL newsletter]
(indicating that RoE guiding soldiers' actions serve to uphold national policy during
armed conflict and ensure that the military instrument of the United States "is indeed
employed pursuant to the overarching national political purposes of our nation").
Id.
244.
Vanessa Blum, JAG Goes to War, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 11, 2001, at 1,
245.
available at http://www.law.com [hereinafter JAG Goes to War].
246.
Schrader, supra note 182; see also Vanessa Blum, From Drafting Wills to
Planning War Strategy,

LEGAL

TIMES,

Sept.

24,

2001,

at

13,

available at

http://www.law.com.
Dunlap, supra note 118, at 296.
247.
"Operational law is that body of foreign, domestic, and international law
248.
which impacts specifically upon the activities of U.S. forces in war and operations other
than war." Lt. Colonel Marc L. Warren, Operational Law-A Concept Matures, 152
MIL. L. REV. 33, 36 (1996).
FM 27-100, supra note 152, at § 8.1.
249.
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involved in the team that puts together combat operations than we
were two decades ago," stated Air Force Judge Advocate General
Major General William Moorman. '"Very precise [legal] planning goes
'2 50
into target selection and vetting targets against the law of war.
However, the involvement of attorneys in the mission planning
process does not mean that the lawyer's judgment supplants the
commander's. It is the responsibility of the lawyer to point out legal
pitfalls and balance the risk of civilian harm against the military
gain, 25 1 but he must distinguish between advising on the law of war
and making decisions on "prudent warfighting" which belong to the
252
commander alone.
Some of the most challenging of these legal analyses are
determinations of the legality of attacking fleeting, unidentified
targets that must be engaged quickly or else lost. These "emerging
targets" get priority in consideration. As explained by Lt. Col. Amy
Bechtold, the Deputy Judge Advocate for Central Command's air
component command:
If a building is identified as a target, that building is not going
anywhere ....
Obviously there is more time to collect information ....
[N]ow, if the target is a building that troops are moving in and out of,
the military objective may not be there a few days from now .... [but]
253
if we can't get that check done [in time], the target is not hit.

However officials contend that military lawyers are never in a
position to stop any attack-"that is the prerogative of [the
254
Commanding General] and other operational commanders alone.
C. How Does Policy Affect RoE?
Success or failure in a military operation can have wide-ranging
effects-it can alter the course of domestic politics, change the
international reputation of the United States, and dramatically affect
U.S. foreign policy. As a result, policymakers, regardless of party,
have rarely been strangers to the planning of military action. War, as
Prussian general Carl von Clausewitz first stated, is merely an
extension of political activity, and thus subject to its requirements.
War is an instrument of policy; it must necessarily bear the character of
policy and measure by its standards. The conduct of war, in its greater
outlines, is therefore policy itself, which takes up the sword in place of

250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

JAG Goes to War, supra note 245.
Id.
Dunlap, supra note 118, at 304.
Id.
Schrader, supra note 182.
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the pen, but does not on that account cease to think according to its own
255
laws.

In the United States, the oft-cited "high-water" mark of civilian
policy involvement came during the 1964-68 "Rolling Thunder" air
campaign in Vietnam. At that time, President Johnson and Secretary
of Defense MacNamara were personally involved in most military
operational planning for the war, including target nomination,
selection of aircraft weapons loads, dates and times of attacks, and
even approach routes of bombers-without regard to strategy,
weather, or other operational considerations. 256 Although these
practices were roundly condemned in the years immediately fbllowing
Vietnam, 257 advances in telecommunications have again generated
new levels of "political military-dynamics, ' 258 where the civilian
leadership is a major player in the operational process.
Political leaders in Washington now have the capability to see
the same information available to the battlefield commander and can
watch events unfold in real time. Although the military would
contend that combat is best managed from the front lines, 259 the
development of global communications and information technology
now allows the highest military echelons, as well as the most senior
civilian political leadership, to reach into the battle and exert their
authority. As explained by General John D. Jumper, the Chief of Staff
of the U.S. Air Force, in "conflicts where you have highly politically

255.
CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 610 (Michael Howard & Peter Paret eds. &
trans., 1984).
256.
LAMBETH, supra note 52, at 31; see also JOHN LEWIS GADDIS, STRATEGIES
OF CONTAINMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF POsTwAR AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY
POLICY 247 (1982); Arkin, supra note 240.
257.
See LAMBETH, supra note 52, at 50.
The right lesson to be drawn from the Vietnam experience [in regards to
civilian involvement in military planning] is not that political control and
restrictive rules of engagement are improper constraints on the use of air
power . . . but rather that once reasonable political objectives, strategies, and
rules of engagement are decided on, political leaders should stay out of the
operational details of force employment in due deference to the trained
professionals who know their business best.
Id.; see also Arkin, supra note 240. Clausewitz would at least partly agree with this
conclusion; he believed that policy would not "extend its influence to operational
details. Political considerations do not determine the posting of guards or the
employment of patrols." VON CLAUSEWITZ, supra note 255, at 606. At the same time
Clausewitz harshly condemned any effort to make political considerations secondary to
military ones. "Subordinating the political point of view to the military would be
absurd, for it is policy that has created war. Policy is the guiding intelligence and war
the only instrument, not vice versa. No other possibility exists, then, to subordinate the
military point of view to the political." Id. at 607.
258.
RIP & HASIK, supra note 39, at 420.
259.
Elaine M. Grossmon, War on Terror Renews Age-Old Puzzle, INSIDE THE
PENTAGON, Jan. 2, 2003, at 1.
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sensitive operations going on, the senior leadership wants to have a
hand in operational- and tactical-level decisions. 2 60 Dubbed by some
the "the new age of military micro-management," 261 these practices
bring out both the best and worst aspects of the U.S. military system.
On the positive side, by exerting the supremacy of the civilian
leadership, top-down political control of the military reinforces the
democratic underpinnings of the U.S. military system. Furthermore,
by bringing politically-accountable civilian officials into the decision
loop, it increases the likelihood that the law of war will be followed.
As explained by Reisman and Antoniou,
Popular perceptions of what the law of armed conflict is, or should be,
may become self-fulfilling . . . in modern popular democracies, even a
limited armed conflict requires a substantial base of public support.
That support can erode or even reverse itself rapidly, no matter how
worthy the political objective, if the people believe that the war is being
262
conducted in an unfair, inhumane, or iniquitous way.

As a result, militaries must adhere to the law of war-or at least
create the perception of doing so-in order to preserve public and
political support for the operation. Fighting lawfully has become more
than just a moral or legal requirement; it has become a political
263
necessity.
The ability of U.S. policymakers to make crucial, tactical-level
military decisions on a real-time basis also has serious negative
ramifications. In situations other than war, the lure of using military
force to send a political "message" has a certain seductive appeal to
policymakers. Although military force is, at its root, an instrument of
politics, lowering the bar for military action so it becomes a mundane
political tool has its own set of dangers. Risking lives-either those of
U.S. servicemen or civilians in the target zone-for less significant
national interests or for fleeting political gain sets a dangerous
precedent and can be deeply damaging for the United States'
international reputation. Known derisively as "cruise missile
diplomacy," 264 the routine use of air power by policymakers for
mundane political ends has been likened to "teenage romance" in that
it provides instantaneous policy "gratification" without the
265
commitment of involvement in an outright war.

260.
Id.
261.
Arkin, supra note 240.
262.
REISMAN & ANTONIOU, supra note 11, at xxiv; see also VICK, supra note 7,
at 52.
263.
Dunlap, supra note 118, at 294.
264.
LAMBETH, supra note 52, at 216.
265.
Id. at 232; see also VICK, supra note 7, at 39-40 (stating that the "speed and
agility of aerospace power, combined with its ability to deliver firepower precisely and
with fairly low risk to U.S. personnel . . . often make it the military instrument of
choice for decisionmakers").
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Furthermore, politicians may not always understand, or care to
understand, that "the efficient application of firepower [is not a]
substitute for strategy,"266 and politically expedient choices of action
may not always produce a positive military result. One of the most
common examples of political needs taking precedence over military
strategy is the use of a gradual escalation of force. The slow
escalation of military force to send a political message can be
politically advantageous as it does not back the opposing state into a
corner, encourages the continuation (or resumption) of negotiations,
and allows the policymaker to avoid proportionality concerns and
international criticism for the use of excessive force. It is not
militarily prudent, however, in that it does little to disrupt enemy
defensive preparations and may actually strengthen the enemy's
resolve by allowing it time to prepare its defenses and adapt to U.S.
operational procedures, while suggesting the United States does not
have the political will to do what it takes to win. 267 In failing
decisively to attack enemy defenses and forces, gradualism as a
military strategy also exposes U.S. aircrews to higher levels of risk by
forcing them to fly missions against an opponent that remains at full
strength. At its core, gradualism ignores the traditional belief that
"sharp wars are brief," as first suggested by the Lieber Code and
echoed by Douhet, Mitchell, and others. In deliberately extending the
length of the war, policymakers may in fact be dragging out the
potential human suffering. Unfortunately, as explained by former
U.S. Air Force General Ralston, 'When the political and tactical
constraints imposed on air use are extensive and pervasive-and that
trend seems more rather than less likely-then gradualism may be
perceived as the only option. '2 68

266.
LAMBETH, supra note 52, at 52.
267.
For example, during the Kosovo campaign, the Clinton Administration's
stated intention only to 'degrade' (and by implication, not to destroy) the Serbian
military, and its public disavowal of the possibility of a ground invasion probably
indicated to Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic that the United States did not
"have the stomach for a sustained military effort." This perceived U.S. reluctance
probably only encouraged Milosevic to stand his ground. See IVo H. DAALDER &
MICHAEL E. O'HANLON, WINNING UGLY: NATO'S WAR TO SAVE Kosovo 95 (2000); see
also LAMBETH, supra note 52, at 17 (suggesting that the slow escalation of force
employed by the Johnson Administration against North Vietnam during the 1965-1968
Rolling Thunder Campaign, although politically prudent in the short-term, provided
the North Vietnamese the time they needed to substantially strengthen their anti-air
defenses). Alternatively, the all-out eleven-day bombing Linebacker II raids against
North Vietnam in 1972 inflicted serious damage against Hanoi, forcing them back to
the negotiating table. See NORDEEN, supra note 107, at 51-56.
268.
LAMBETH, supra note 52, at 229.
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V. WHERE THE RUBBER MEETS THE ROAD: POLICY AND LAW DRIVING
MILITARY OPERATIONS

Examining the air conflicts of the last fifteen years provides
ample proof for establishing the scope of policy and legal controls on
U.S. military operations. Since the end of the Gulf War, conscientious
adherence to the laws of war and Washington's policy requirements
have shaped U.S. military operations to minimize unnecessary
casualties, prevent media criticism, and defuse international
controversy. Typically, these goals have been accomplished through
RoE that have limited the choice of targets and method of attack, or
attempted to minimize unnecessary friendly or collateral deaths.
A. Limitation on Choice of Targets and Method of Attack
During the First Gulf War, exceptional effort was made to
respect the law of war during Coalition operations. According to the
then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell
international legal considerations impacted decision making "at every
level. '269 Particular attention was paid to the review of proposed
target lists "to ensure the consistency of targets selected for attack
with United States law of war obligations." 270 In compliance with the
principle of discrimination, the Department of Defense drew up a
master "no-strike" list that incorporated all civilian sites-such as
schools, hospitals, and mosques-within six miles of all target
zones. 271 As "planners were aware that each bomb carried a potential
moral and political impact, '272 where risk of collateral damage was
too high, the target was not attacked. 273 Furthermore, if pilots were
unable visually to confirm the identity of the target, they were
274
required to abort or divert to a secondary target.
CENTCOM also complied with the doctrines of proportionality
and humanity by matching targets to weapons to minimize adverse
effects. 275 "To the degree possible and consistent with allowable risk
to aircraft and aircrews," 276 the type of weapon used, the time and
direction of attack, desired impact point, and degree of force employed

269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.

GULF WAR REPORT, supra note 6, at 605.
Id. at 607.
See id. at 61.
Id. at 132.
Id. at 133.
See id. at 612.
Id.
Id.
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were all exhaustively choreographed to reduce possible collateral
damage. 277 For example, attacks inside Baghdad were conducted only
with PGMs, 278 and if a proposed target served both military and
civilian purposes, the attack was usually scheduled at night to reduce
noncombatant casualties. 2 79 Additionally, in compliance with Article
27 of Hague IV, Coalition forces generally abstained from attacks on
mosques, religious shrines, and archaeological sites. Even where
some of these sites could legally have been attacked under the law of
war, in some cases the Coalition chose not to do so out of sensitivity to
the political consequences or the disproportionate civilian harm and
minimal strategic gain that would be generated by their
280
destruction.
Even more stringent precautions were taken during the 1999
Kosovo air campaign. In-depth legal reviews were performed on all
potential strike targets-including a complete analysis of their
location, military significance, possible collateral damage, and
potential risk if the weapon missed the target. 28 1 This analysis was
then, in the words of NATO Commander General Wesley Clark,
"repeated for different types of weapons, in search of the specific
type ...and warhead size that would destroy the target and have the
least adverse impact elsewhere. '' 28 2 Additionally, any target
considered potentially sensitive was to be reviewed by the President,
the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. 28 3 The senior political leadership strictly limited target
selection to correspond with their strategy of slowly escalating the
intensity of attacks. Intended purely as a "coercive operation ... with
the implied goal of merely inflicting enough pain to convince
[Yugoslav President Slobodan] Milosevic to capitulate," 28 4 the air
campaign initially had only a very limited target base, much of it
selected by the White House. 285 Because the White House and its
European partners believed Milosevic would swiftly capitulate after
only a limited number of essentially "symbolic '28 6 airstrikes, in the
first few days of the conflict, NATO's civilian leadership had approved
only enough targets for three days' worth of bombing, about ninety in
all. 28 7 Another 1,021 were eventually nominated 288 on a running

277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.

Id.
Id. at 131.
Id. at 133.
Id. at 613.
JAG Goes to War, supra note 245.
Id.; see also LAMBETH, supra note 52, at 220.
Id. at 204.
Id. at 183.
RiP & HASIK, supra note 39, at 421.
DAALDER & O'HANLON, supra note 267, at 117.
Id. at 91, 117.
NORDEEN, supra note 107, at 255.
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basis as the campaign failed to convince Milosevic to withdraw from
Kosovo. As a result, high-impact strategic targets such as statecontrolled television, power generation facilities, and suspected
shelters for the Serbian political elite were not hit until relatively late
in the war.2 89 Additionally, because the Administration was
concerned that a serious collateral damage incident could shake the
commitment of some of the more hesitant NATO partners, 125
targets, regardless of their military significance, were removed from
the target list by the Clinton Administration due to their proximity to
civilian buildings.29 0 Restrictions intended to limit civilian casualties
were enforced on pilots as well; NATO pilots were instructed to
return home with their weapons unless the target could be positively
identified. That requirement, in combination with the frequently poor
weather, forced many sorties to be diverted or aborted. 291 Overall, the
measures undertaken to avoid collateral damage were described by
one Air Force Major General as "as strict as I've seen" during his
nearly thirty-year career. 292 However, this same exercise of caution
generated some friction in the military leadership as to their
Senior U.S. military leaders voiced
propriety and effectiveness.
serious complaints about the slow pace of the campaign, restricted
target list, and rules of engagement that "all but proscribed any
' 2 93
serious application of air power. "
U.S. efforts to minimize collateral damage were no less thorough
during the second Gulf War. In accordance with the principles of
"guidance
proportionality,
specialized
discrimination
and
apportionment and targeting teams" reviewed pre-established lists of
targets to determine their legitimacy as military objectives, their
proximity to civilian structures, and the minimum force that would be
required to destroy them. 294 For each attack, computers designed a
"weaponeering solution," or a prediction of how to destroy the target
while limiting the attack's effect on the surrounding area. To ensure
there is no overlap between the bomb's effects and civilian sites
nearby, the software modeled the bomb blast based on warhead size
and the angle of attack, and displayed that data against a map of
295
civilian sites in the area.

289.
LAMBETH, supra note 52, at 185-87; DAALDER & O'HANLON, supra note 267,
at 117.
290.
NORDEEN, supra note 107, at 255; LAMBETH, supra note 52, at 204.
291.
LAMBETH, supra note 52, at 204-06.
292.
Id. at 204.
Id. at 217.
293.
294.
Kim Murphy and Alan C. Miller, The Team That Picks the Targets:
Planners Tout Weapons' High-tech Precision but Admit Mistakes are Made, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 25, 2003, at Al.
Id.
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In addition to shaping the method of attack, RoE can also reflect
a concern for the post-war consequences of a bombing campaign. For
example, during the Afghanistan campaign, U.S. target selection was
driven by the consequences of any attack on the reconstruction effort.
"Things like transportation infrastructure very often are bona fide
legal targets," explains Brigadier General Charles Dunlap, Air
Combat Command's Staff Judge Advocate. "But we look for ways of
minimizing that damage because we're always thinking about what's
the next step going to be. What are we going to be doing after the
conflict is over?" 296 For example, in Afghanistan in 2001, the RoE
reflected concerns that unrestricted attacks on infrastructure would
only worsen the suffering of the Afghan people by preventing the
timely delivery of humanitarian aid. Washington was also cognizant
that during the reconstruction phase they would have to pay to repair
any wartime damage. 29 7 As a result, CENTCOM Commander General
Tommy Franks forbid almost all attacks on "sensitive" infrastructure,
including electrical power systems, roads, and industry, or any target
that had "political implications," such as mosques, even if they were
being used for military purposes. 298 Senior officers running the air
campaign could not engage these targets without prior approval from
Washington.2 9 9 These limitations far exceeded the requirements of
the law of war which recognizes any infrastructure with military
value as a legitimate target for attack provided the casualties from
the attack would not be disproportionate. Additionally, even cultural
or religious sites such as mosques may be attacked under
international law if they are being used for military purposes.
Similarly, the policy requirement during the second Gulf War to
avoid unduly burdening the reconstruction effort also shaped RoE.
The White House was reportedly concerned with demonstrating to
the Iraqi people that the real target of the war was Saddam's regime,
in hopes that this would make them more willing to accept a U.S.
military rule until an Iraqi democratic
government was
established.3 00 Thus, dual-use targets with military value such as
power generation,
telephone networks,
and transportation
infrastructure such as highway bridges were spared in favor of
attacks against regime and regime-associated facilities. 3° 1 Particular
attention was paid to protecting the Iraqi oil infrastructure, 30 2 as the
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Bush administration deemed these sites critical for funding the postregime government.
B. Sensitivities to Friendly Casualtiesor CollateralDamage
One of the factors most commonly underscoring policy
involvement in military planning since Vietnam 30 3 has been
sensitivity to friendly casualties or collateral damage. Known
derisively as 'Vietnam Syndrome," or "the Mogadishu Effect,"
policymakers fear that U.S. casualties will spur a public outcry to end
military operations. 30 4 Ironically, precision warfare might be a victim
of its own success in this regard.30 5 The relatively bloodless U.S.
victories in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kosovo have created an unrealistic
30 6
public expectation of swift and low-casualty military campaigns.
With a "no casualty campaign" arguably now the de facto standard for
any U.S. military operation, air power has come to be judged by a
nearly impossible standard. Every instance of unintended collateral
damage, no matter how reasonable or unavoidable, is interpreted by
some as evidence of a military failure.30 7 Likewise, extensive
collateral damage to the opponent state-even if unnoticed by the
U.S. public--can cause international criticism and create political
08
complications.
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It is important to note that the military's sensitivity to friendly
deaths, however, can actually "push in opposite directions" from the
desire to avoid collateral casualties. 30 9 Extreme sensitivity to friendly
casualties may result in choices of weapons and RoE that protect the
pilot, rather than minimize risk of collateral damage. 3 10 For example,
during the air war over Kosovo in 1999, Washington required that
pilots on combat missions fly no lower than 15,000 feet to avoid
Serbian air defenses. This reduced the risk of a politically costly
shoot-down or POW incident that could be damaging to the
Administration. However, this move also increased the number of
civilian casualties on the ground by making it difficult for pilots
positively to identify targets.31 ' Conversely, RoE intended to allow
accurate bombing and minimize collateral damage also places pilots
in greater danger, by forcing them to fly lower and more slowly to
identify the target-exposing them to potentially deadly ground
fire. 312 The key policy challenge has been to balance the political risk
and legal requirements 3 13 in RoE in order to maximize military
314
effectiveness while minimizing risk of collateral damage.
In the case of the Afghanistan campaign, President Bush
reportedly made low collateral damage a requirement for the
military, 315 in order to assuage concerns in the Muslim world about
the conduct of the war and combat the perception that the campaign
was directed against Islam as a whole. 3 16 As a result, the Pentagon
tightened its already strict targeting requirements; targets were
nominated by personnel in the field and reviewed by lawyers under
the supervision of commanders. 3 17 In line with the principles of
military necessity, proportionality, and discrimination, these panels
determined whether the target was being used for a military purpose,
and judged whether the potential for civilian deaths outweighed the
usefulness of a strike.3 18 They reviewed what types of munitions were
used to minimize unintended damage, and although the final decision
belonged to the commander, the board could recommend that the
bomb hit the target at a different angle or time to reduce collateral

ended for fear it looked like the United States was engaged "in slaughter for
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damage. 319 Coalition pilots were generally denied permission to
attack civilian vehicles, despite the fact that the Taliban generally
used vans and trucks to move combat troops.3 20 The overwhelming
reliance on precision, rather than unguided, weapons in this conflict
also reflected an official Department of Defense policy choice to begin
abandoning unguided bombs. "We are moving away from dumb
bombs as much as possible . . . [g]iven concerns over collateral
damage ... and the tight quarters in which we operate, there is good

reason to want the lion's share of our weapons to be precision32
guided." l
The process of proposing, reviewing, and vetting targets was so
exhaustive during Afghanistan that U.S. Air Force officials reportedly
complained that it had hampered the effort to kill senior Taliban and
al Qaeda officials. According to one officer familiar with execution of
the war, "We knew we had some of the big boys . . .[but] the process

is so slow that by the time we got the clearances, and everybody had
put in their two cents, we called it off.''3 22 According to another
observer, "the whole issue of collateral damage pervaded every level
of the operation . . . it is shocking the degree to [it] hamstrung the

campaign."3 23
Some
anonymous
officers
complained
that
CENTCOM's top lawyers were so concerned about collateral damage
that they refused to authorize strikes even when the targets were
"unambiguously" military in nature. 32 4 The lead CENTCOM JAG was
especially criticized for her repeated second-guessing of senior U.S.
Air Force officers, 325 while other senior officers complained that
General Franks was heavily influenced by the "excessive doubts" of
his legal advisor. As a result, as many as twelve times in late October
to mid-November 2001, the U.S. Air Force reportedly believed they
had top al Qaeda and Taliban officials in their gunsights but were not
capable of completing the target review process in time to engage
them.3 26 In one such alleged event reported in the press, a Taliban
military convoy was moving north to the front lines, and although
U.S. Air Force targeteers believed it to be a prime target, the
CENTCOM JAG attorneys refused to authorize the attack for fear "it
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might be a trick,"327 and that the convoy might contain children. Such
stories-if true-would corroborate insider accounts that CENTCOM
officials were reportedly "deathly afraid of a setup"328 because of
political pressure to avoid a bloody collateral damage incident that
would publicly damage the campaign.

VI. THE COSTS OF PLAYING FAIR
The U.S. dedication to respect the law of war continues despite
opponents who would exploit it to their advantage. As explained above,
for domestic political reasons, the United States requires the
perception-at least at home, if not abroad-that it holds the moral
high ground. Compliance with the law of war on the part of the United
States encourages like behavior by other states, which is also beneficial
as it increases the predictability of state actions, as well as acting as a
stabilizing force that helps to maintain a status quo in which the
United States maintains its preeminence. 329 As a result, the United
States generally "plays by the rules" in complying with the law of war
or through policy controls that accomplish that same effect. This is a
limitation in its own right--"a war plan based on self-contradictory
politico-military objectives-e.g., destroy the military but spare
civilians-will inevitably restrict operations." 330 This is compounded by
the likelihood that any potential adversary of the United States will
not reciprocate its adherence to the law of war. Instead, future
opponents-likely dictators or rogue states such as Iran, Syria, or
possibly North Korea, or shattered anarchical societies such as
Somalia-are the type of states that are the least likely to comply.
"Since law is generally a conservative force," notes one observer, "it is
'33 1
more likely to be observed by those more content with their lot."
Pariah states are rarely so content, and the only penalty for
committing violations-international condemnation and isolationmay have already been imposed for other reasons. Another factor
encouraging the violation of international law for opponent states is a
perception of the stakes of the conflict. What may only be a small
regional war to the United States could be a major confrontation to a
332
smaller opponent.
Contrary to some predictions that the use of PGMs by the United
States will "firmly cement the demarcation between combatants and
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non-combatants," 333 the huge technological advantage the United
States has over its opponents will likely discourage some states to
comply with the law.3 3 4 The more technologically advanced the
United States becomes, the more its opponents will seek to employ
unlawful "asymmetric" attacks in order to even the playing field.
Potential adversaries the world over closely watch U.S. combat
operations so they can predict the success of their own weapons and
tactics against U.S. forces, and already indicators of foreign training
and doctrine suggest potential opponents believe that increasing
Western reliance on high-tech weapons and tactics generates a
vulnerability to low-tech countermeasures, including urban and
guerilla warfare. 335 These counterweights by definition require
violations of the law of war, such as mixing combatants and
noncombatants, the placement of military targets in religious or
cultural facilities, or deliberate attacks against noncombatants.
Technological superiority does little to prevent these tactics; for
example, U.S. air- and space-borne sensors, in the words of one
retired Marine Corps General, do "a fantastic job in wide open spaces.
[They do] not, however, do all we would like [them] to do in a
cluttered environment. '336 Nothing can instantly identify an "enemy
company in the basement of [a] built up area" 337 or distinguish the
"twelve terrorists mixed with that crowd in the village market. '338
This inability to distinguish combatants from noncombatants will
discourage adversaries from separating themselves from the civilian
population or identifying themselves as the law of war requires. 33 9
Because few opponents will expect to be able to defend against
U.S. air superiority on open terrain, U.S. adversaries may also
withdraw into the cities for cover. The dense concentration of civilian
population and military objectives inside cities are an ideal place to
hide-and also vastly increase the chances of unintended or
disproportionate collateral damage.3 40 As explained by one formal
study, "heightened risk of collateral damage when operating in urban
environments partially offsets U.S. technological superiority and
provides adversaries with expanded opportunities to exploit U.S.
adherence to certain norms. ''341 Thus, U.S. forces should expect to
face more opponents who will fight primarily in urban environments,
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co-mingle civilian and military assets, employ civilian transportation
and civilian facilities for military use, and manipulate the media into
broadcasting every U.S. slip-up for their own propaganda gain. 342 W.
Hays Park's admonition that "the defender has accomplished his
mission if he makes the attacker miss the target" 343 is especially true
if the consequences of a missed weapon are exaggerated 3and
44
broadcast live on al-Jazeera for the propaganda gain of the enemy.
These sorts of violations have become more than theoretical;
nearly every opponent of the United States since the end of the Cold
War has sought to turn the laws of war to their advantage. During
the 1991 Gulf War, Coalition forces amassed a laundry list of Iraqi
legal violations-mainly using civilian facilities to shield military
objectives and a failure to separate the civilian population from target
zones. According to the official Department of Defense report of the
war, Iraqi military helicopters were hidden in residential areas and
34 5
military supplies were stored in mosques, hospitals, and schools.
More specifically, a cache of Silkworm cruise missiles was found in a
school in Kuwait City, and Iraqi fighter aircraft were parked next to
the ancient temple of Ur. 346 Public announcements that Coalition
forces would not attack populated targets only increased the
dispersion of Iraqi military assets into densely populated urban
areas. 347 Iraqi civilians were never evacuated from the city or from
military targets, and less than one percent of the city's population
had access to air raid shelters. 348 The Iraqi regime employed similar
tactics during the second Gulf War, depositing huge caches of arms
into countless schools and mosques, and placing air defense weapons
on top of hospitals and other public works. These violations are not
limited to Iraq; during Operation Allied Force in the Balkans, the
Serbs used churches, schools, and hospitals to shelter equipment from
U.S. air strikes, 349 and in Afghanistan the Taliban sheltered combat
personnel and arms caches in mosques and schools.
One particularly costly collateral damage incident demonstrates
how a humanitarian disaster stemming from violations of the law of
war, and compounded by an urban environment, can be turned to a
violator's advantage. On February 13, 1991, two F-117A stealth
fighters attacked a hardened shelter in Baghdad that U.S.
intelligence had reportedly identified as a "command and control (C2)
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bunker".3 5 0 Also known as the al-Amariyah bunker, the site had been
constructed in the middle of a populated area as an air raid shelter,
but was later converted into a C2 bunker. It had been camouflaged,
surrounded with barbed wire, and was protected by armed guards. 35 1
The bunker had reportedly been considered as a target several times,
but had been dismissed each time until intelligence had finally
confirmed its purpose. 35 2 Unknown to U.S. intelligence, however,
selected civilians-likely the families of officers working withinwere being allowed to take shelter in the bunker at night in a civilian
section one level above the military areas. 353 The Iraqi's commingling
of combatant and noncombatant facilities, and their failure to remove
the civilian population from the site was in violation of the law of
war. However, when U.S. bombs destroyed the facility, killing in
excess of 300 civilians, 354 little mention was made of those Iraqi
violations in the press. Footage of the charred bodies of children being
pulled out of the ruins of the bunker was broadcast by the global
media and sufficiently damaged the Bush Administration so that all
future strikes on Baghdad were subjected to personal review by
CENTCOM commander General Norman Schwartzkopf and
355
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell.

VII. CONCLUSION

The United States conducts its aerial campaigns under a strict
set of legal and policy restrictions designed to reflect national political
requirements and respect for the international law of war. Although
such safeguards are never a guarantee that a conflict will be
bloodless, the precautions taken by the United States meet or exceed
the requirements of international law. In contrast to earlier wars,
where it was the accepted practice for vast formations of bombers to
decimate entire areas in order to hit a single target, small numbers of
U.S. laser and GPS guided bombs now strike targets with an exacting
economy of force. Precision warfare has made armed conflict both
more and less lethal. 35 6 The majority of weapons used by the U.S.
military in recent conflicts are capable of striking legitimate targets
with unmatched precision. But at the same time, the entire targeting
process is pervaded with self-imposed safeguards to protect civilian
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lives. Military lawyers are embedded into the targeting process to
ensure every target may be legitimately attacked under the law of
armed conflict, while each military target is carefully identified and
vetted for the risk of collateral damage. Meanwhile, military
"weaponeers" deliberately engineer every strike to employ the
minimum amount of force needed to destroy the target. Even where
the destruction of a target is allowed by the law of war, commanders
may abort the strike out of concern that disproportionate numbers of
casualties would result. Pressure from the civilian leadership only
focuses the intensity of these efforts, as the political consequences of a
significant collateral damage incident can dramatically alter or even
terminate a military operation.
No military campaign is ever perfect, and it is an unfortunate
consequence that some civilians will inevitably die as the result of
aerial bombing. U.S. practice in the Gulf Wars, Kosovo, and
Afghanistan has been successful in limiting civilian deaths and
establishing that U.S. practice is consistent with the core legal
doctrines of proportionality, discrimination, military necessity, and
humanity. The respect demonstrated by U.S. forces for the law of war
even goes so far as to constitute a disadvantage when fighting rogue
states who violate these same laws to protect their combat forces.
U.S. forces must comply with the law of war and policy requirements
even when their adversaries do not; they must uphold the rules of
engagement even when the enemy hides among the civilian
population and uses mosques and schools to hide its weapons and
ammunition.
Some would argue that the caution demonstrated by the United
States only exceeds the letter of the law because the law has not kept
current with the development of tactics and technology. To a certain
degree, this is true-the law of war has always lagged behind the
accepted practice of the day. Currently, there exists no customary
requirement for the use of precision weapons nor a requirement for
total accountability for the effects of each bombing strike. The law
merely requires "reasonable care" in the pressing of attacks against
military targets and good faith efforts to avoid unnecessary or
disproportionate levels of loss or suffering. Although the United
States is capable of-and does exercise-a higher level of care to
avoid casualties, it is a dubious proposal that this higher
"superpower" standard should be applied against all other nations.
The purpose of the law of war is to encourage nations to comply,
resulting in a reduction of unnecessary suffering and destruction.
Only a select few nations possess guided weapons, and even less have
a sufficient quantity to carry out an extended air campaign using only
those weapons. To apply a total "precision" standard only to the
United States raises questions of equity and fairness. Imposing it
against all nations, regardless of their ability to maintain the
standard, would set the law up to be violated. Only by keeping the
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international requirements at a realistic and attainable level for all
nations can we hope to avoid the conclusion suggested by Sir Arthur
Harris, Commander of British Bomber Command during World War
II: "International law can always be argued pro and con, but in this
matter of the use of aircraft in war there is, it so happens, no
''35 7
international law at all.
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